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ABSTRACT
This research investigates the feasibility, benefits, impacts and costs of replacing F-
76 with JP-5 and adopting JP-5 as the single "universal fuel at sea." Joint Publication 4-
03, Joint Bulk Petroleum Doctrine states, "Department ofDefense components should
minimize the number of bulk petroleum products that must be stocked and distributed."
DoD currently stores and distributes two fuels, F-76 and JP-5, for shipboard use. As the
universal fuel at sea JP-5 would replace F-76. All shipboard systems, including boilers,
turbine engines and diesel engines that currently operate with F-76 should operate
satisfactorily with JP-5. Adopting JP-5 as the single fuel stocked and distributed for
shipboard use would simplify logistics support, maximize flexibility, and enhance the
readiness and sustainability of U.S. forces at sea.
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Central to the U.S. Navy war fighting capability and strategy is the capacity to
deploy and to sustain forces whenever and wherever required. This capacity is based on
the ability to maintain a continuous and responsive logistics flow delivered to forces at sea
in the theater of operations. Fuel has the highest demand of all the materials provided by
this logistics flow and is one ofthe most critical supplies. The wars ofthe previous
century are replete with examples of battles and even wars where a deciding factor was an
adequate supply of fuel, or more often a lack of it.
Simplicity, flexibility and interoperability have historically proven important to
maintaining continuous responsive fuel support (JP 4-0, p. II- 1 and JP 4-03, p 1-1). To
maximize simplicity, flexibility and interoperability, Joint Publication 4-03, Joint Bulk
Petroleum Doctrine states, "Department of Defense (DOD) components should minimize
the number of bulk petroleum products that must be stocked and distributed, plan to use
fuels readily available worldwide, and minimize the military-unique characteristics ofDOD
fuels." (JP 4-03, pp. 1-1- 1-2)
Ideally, all ofDOD would use a single fuel and that fuel would be a commercial
fuel readily available everywhere. Unfortunately, this ideal is not possible. For safety
reasons, military specification JP-5 is the only fuel acceptable for use in Naval aircraft at
sea. JP-5 is a military-unique fuel that is only available from refineries that manufacture it
under contract for DoD and allied forces. Either more than one fuel must be used or the
single fuel used must be military-unique.
While the ideal single fuel is not possible, DoD components have adopted military
specification JP-8 as the single fuel stocked and distributed for use in all aircraft, vehicles
and equipment ashore. Although JP-8 is military-unique, it is identical (with the exception
of additives) to commercial JET Al, the international standard jet fuel used in most
commercial aircraft. Forces ashore frequently use commercial jet fuels (whenever aircraft
refuel at commercial facilities) and other commercial fuels (diesel in vehicles for example)
available worldwide as substitutes for JP-8. DoD forces ashore have successfully
implemented the principles and guidance of Joint Publication 4-03.
As discussed above, the Navy has not accepted JP-8 or its commercial substitutes
at sea for safety reasons. JP-8 and commercial jet fuels have a minimum ignition flash
point of 100° Fahrenheit. To prevent fires aboard ship, the minimum acceptable flashpoint
for fuels used at sea is 140° Fahrenheit.
Although JP-8 cannot be used at sea, the Navy could adopt JP-5 as the only bulk
fuel stored and distributed by DoD for shipboard use. "All shipboard systems, including
boilers, turbine engines and diesel engines should continue to operate satisfactorily, and in
some instances, with increased efficiency with JP-5." (Tosh, p. ii) DoD, however,
continues to store and distribute two fuels for shipboard use, JP-5 and Diesel Fuel Marine
(DFM), military specification F-76. JP-5 is used in aircraft. F-76 is used in ships'
equipment including ships' propulsion systems. Both JP-5 and F-76 are military-unique
fuels and are not readily available worldwide. There is no substitute for JP-5, but JP-5 is
an acceptable substitute for F-76.
Since it is possible for the Navy to adopt JP-5 as the single fuel stored and
distributed by DoD for shipboard use but it has not done so, it is natural to ask, ''why
not?" The question has been studied before, starting as early as 1967 (Tosh, p. iii and
Higgins, 22 September 1998), and is one ofthe most frequently asked questions the Navy
Petroleum Office receives from flag officers (Higgins, 7 September 1999). The reasons
JP-5 has not been adopted as the single fuel at sea are cost and availability. JP-5 costs
approximately five cents more a gallon than F-76. Availability is limited because some
refineries can't make JP-5 and some oil companies are not interested in making JP-5.
The question, however, needs further examination. Previous studies have
concentrated almost exclusively on technical issues, and the cost and availability of JP-5.
Because they have been conducted from a technical point of view, the operational,
readiness and logistical benefits have been for the most part understated, overlooked and
misunderstood. For example the "Navy Fuel Specification Standardization Study" study
conducted by the Belvoir Fuels and Lubricants Research Facility in 1992 reported, "The
greatest benefit from such a conversion would be the convenience of handling only one
fuel, and eliminating the possibility of fuel contamination." (Tosh) This statement,
followed by, "The major penalties would include higher fuel cost, and difficulty in
procuring adequate supplies of JP-5 to meet the total U.S. Navy shipboard fuel
requirements," (Tosh) didn't present a convincing argument to adopt JP-5 as the single
fuel at sea. The actual benefits, however, far exceed what could be called "convenience"
and eliminating the possibility of fuel contamination pales in significance to other benefits.
In addition, changes in the past decade favor adopting JP-5 as the single fuel for
shipboard use. For example, the 1992 Belvoir study reported the increased fuel cost of
replacing F-76 with JP-5 would be approximately $103,000,000 a year based on the five
cents per gallon standard price difference between JP-5 and F-76 (Tosh, p. 24). The
standard price difference between JP-5 and F-76 in FY 1999 was still cents per gallon, but
military downsizing has reduced F-76 consumption. Based on 1 999 consumption and the
same estimating methodology, the estimated cost in 1 999 would have been approximately
$36,000,000 (Scheffs, 12 March 2000). The difference in the standard prices of F-76 and
JP-5 during FY 2000 is only three cents per gallon.
A. PURPOSE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This research investigates the feasibility, benefits, impacts and costs of adopting
JP-5 as the single fuel stocked and distributed by DoD for shipboard use. The primary
question addressed by this thesis is, should the Navy adopt JP-5 as the only fuel stocked
and distributed by DOD for shipboard use? This issue is, however, very complex. The
Energy Plans and Policy Branch for Deputy Chief ofNaval Operations, Logistics has
contracted with consultants and intends to establish a process action team (PAT) to study
the issue. The PAT, will include members from the Defense Energy Support Center
(DESC), the Navy Petroleum Office (NAVPETOFF), Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEA), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and others. The purpose of this thesis is
to offer a starting point for the PAT's research efforts. (Roberts and Strucko)
Secondary research questions for this purpose include the following:
(1) What are the technical and maintenance issues involved with replacing F-76
with JP-5 in shipboard equipment and systems?
(2) Is sufficient JP-5 available at reasonable cost from commercial refineries?
(3) What are the operational and readiness benefits and impacts of replacing F-
76 with JP-5?
(4) How would replacing F-76 with JP-5 best be implemented?
(5) What would be the cost of replacing F-76 with JP-5?
B. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
1. Scope
Since it is the operational and readiness benefits and impacts of JP-5 as the single
fuel at sea that have been generally neglected in previous studies, they will be emphasized
in this research. The technical feasibility and maintenance issues involved in replacing F-
76 with JP-5 will be addressed by a synopsis of previous studies. Availability of adequate
refinery supplies of JP-5 will be examined in some detail. Of course, cost is a very
important issue and will also be addressed.
2. Limitations
This thesis is limited to unclassified information. Warship fuel storage capacity,
war reserve and peacetime operating stock quantities, as well as the methodologies used
to calculate those quantities are classified. This limits some discussions in this thesis to
hypothetical examples. It would be valuable to model these events using real data, but
that is left for future classified studies.
Cost will be examined, but a true cost-benefit analysis is beyond our scope.
Implementation would occur over a period as long as ten years. The price of fuels
depends upon the commercial market and cannot be accurately predicted. Transportation
costs depend upon the specific refinery sources used and these cannot be identified until
contracts are awarded. Using a single fuel would also result in many small cost savings
that are difficult to identify and estimate. For example, the accounting and administrative
costs of managing one fuel would likely be less than that of managing two fuels.
The savings from use of a single fuel would be spread out among all the storage
activities, ships, laboratories, etc. that currently deal with two fuels. The savings at any
individual activity might be negligible, but perhaps as a whole they would be significant.
Other potential savings that could offset the higher price of JP-5 are similarly difficult to
measure.
In addition to the difficulty ofmeasuring costs, it is impossible to put a price on the
benefits. What is the dollar value of improved readiness?
Cost will be addressed throughout this thesis, but an accurate cost estimate is
beyond the scope of this research and a cost-benefit analysis is not within our scope.
C. METHODOLOGY
A wide variety of references as well as interviews and correspondence were used
in the collection of data for this thesis. DoD and Navy publications were used to ascertain
policy, operational requirements and current logistics methodologies. Previous studies of
the issue were reviewed, including the "Navy Fuel Specification Standardization" report
prepared by the Belvoir Fuels and Lubricants Research Facility, which examined replacing
F-76 with JP-5 in April 1992; studies prepared for the DoD conversion to JP-8 as the
single fuel used ashore; and a study for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
completed in June 1998, which was considering adopting a high-flash point JP-5 type fuel
for use in all commercial airlines.
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter II provides background
information on Naval petroleum logistics, fuel types, and the single fuel concept. Chapter
III is a synopsis of previous research on the technical and maintenance issues involved in
replacing F-76 with JP-5. Chapter IV addresses the availability of JP-5, both as the most
significant problem and the most significant benefit of replacing F-76 with JP-5. Chapter
V addresses the operational and readiness benefits and impacts of replacing F-76 with JP-
5. Chapter V also examines the cost of replacing F-76 with JP-5. Chapter VI concludes
the thesis with recommendations for DoD and suggests areas for further study.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides the background information necessary to understand the
universal-fuel-at-sea concept and to assess its feasibility, benefits and impacts.
Specifically, this chapter discusses the types of fuel used by DoD, the organizations with
petroleum logistics roles related to this research, and the petroleum logistics supply chain
from refinery to warship. This chapter also provides historical background and defines the
universal-fuel-at-sea concept as interpreted in this research.
B. TYPES AND PRICES OF FUEL
1. JP-5 (Turbine Fuel, Aviation; Naval Jet Fuel)
JP-5 is a 100% kerosene-blend high-flash point jet fuel used by all U.S. Navy
shipboard aircraft. JP-5 differs from other jet fuels because its minimum flash point is
140° F. The specifications for both the international standard commercial jet fuel (JET
Al) and the DoD jet fuel used ashore (JP-8) only require a minimum flash point of 100°.
Flash point is the temperature at which fuel will produce enough vapor to flash into flames
when a spark is introduced. Since temperatures aboard ships and on ships' decks can
exceed 1 00° F, and unlike in buildings and on airfields personnel cannot just evacuate or
move away from a fire, all Navy shipboard fuels must have a minimum flash point of 140.
JP-5 is the only fuel approved for shipboard aviation. JP-5 is a unique military fuel
without any equivalent or substitute, commercial or military. JP-5 is, however, an
acceptable substitute for both F-76, the Navy ships' bunker (propulsion) fuel, and for JP-
8, the single fuel stored and distributed by DoD for forces ashore. This research examines
replacing F-76 with JP-5 and adopting JP-5 as the only fuel routinely stored and
distributed by DoD for shipboard use.
2. F-76 (Naval Distillate Fuel)
Naval distillate fuel, commonly referred to as F-76, Diesel Fuel Marine or DFM, is
the primary bunker (propulsion) fuel for Navy ships. F-76 is the bunker fuel stored in
DoD fuel terminals (DFSPs) and delivered to ships by MSC tankers and Navy oilers. F-76
is similar, but not identical, to Marine Gas Oil (MGO) and other commercial diesels.
A primary difference between F-76 and commercial fuels relates to stability
requirements. Refineries use both simple distillation and complex chemical processes to
refine crude oil into usable fuels. Distillation separates the crude oil into lighter and
heavier components using heat. One of the components obtained from distillation, after
some purification, is essentially diesel fuel. The specification for F-76 requires that it be
made from this straight distillate. Refineries also use complex chemical processes,
cracking for example, to break down heavier crude components into diesel fuels; however,
to some extent over time these processes reverse and elements of the fuel will revert to
something closer to their crude state. F-76 also contains stability additives that are not
typically included in commercial fuels. Because DoD stores fuel for extended periods as
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war reserve, stability is essential. Straight distillate fuel and stability additives are required
for war reserve storage.
Another significant difference between F-76 and commercial marine diesel is that,
for shipboard safety, F-76 has a minimum 140° F. flash point specification. Almost all
commercial diesel fuels inherently meet this minimum, however, a rninimum flash point is
not a standard commercial requirement.
Other F-76 specifications relate to fuel quality. For example, there are limits on
particulates and water, ash remaining after burning, and corrosiveness. These
specifications are intended to ensure that the fuel will not damage ships' engines over long
periods of use.
JP-5, Marine Gas Oil (MGO) and commercial diesels that meet the MGO purchase
description are acceptable substitutes for use as ship's bunker fuel. This research
examines replacing F-76 with JP-5. Adopting JP-5 as the universal fuel at sea would not
prohibit the use of F-76. F-76 would remain an acceptable bunker fuel and could be used
freely whenever advantageous.
3. Marine Gas Oil (MGO)
Navy ships must frequently refuel in ports located worldwide that do not have a
Navy base or DFSP. Since F-76 is a military specification fuel, it is not available from
commercial vendors. Marine Gas Oil (MGO) is an acceptable commercial substitute
bunker fuel that is readily available in large quantities and in almost every port worldwide.
MGO is approved for use as an alternative bunker fuel only when F-76 is not available.
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While MGO is an acceptable bunker fuel, it is not a complete substitute for F-76.
If it were a complete substitute, there wouldn't be a need for the F-76 specification. The
Navy maintains a purchase description, similar to a specification, for MGO. This purchase
description requires that MGO be pure distillate, but does not require stability additives.
A rninimum 140° F flash point is also required. Other quality requirements are similar to
F-76, but less stringent. The U.S. Coast Guard relies on MGO for much of its bunkering.
Coast Guard maintenance personnel believe that continuous and long-term use ofMGO
results in greater wear and higher maintenance costs then when F-76 is used (Roberts, 17
February 2000).
Because it lacks stability additives, MGO must be consumed within six weeks of
receipt. MGO is not acceptable for storage in DFSPs as war reserve or even as peacetime
operating stock. In addition, MSC and Navy oilers are not permitted to carry MGO.
During peacetime, oilers frequently hold stocks longer than six weeks. Oilers also
replenish before using all inventory onboard, so some product remains when additional
fuel is loaded. Loading oilers with MGO could result in problems due to deteriorating
fuel. During a contingency when fuel stock turnover is high, deterioration would be less
of an issue.
Loading MGO onboard an oiler also creates much greater risk than created by a
single ship bunkering. DESC tests show that most MGO delivered under their bunker
contracts does not actually meet the Navy MGO purchase description for rninimum quality
requirements (Roberts, 1 7 February 2000). Despite not meeting the requirements, MSC
and Navy ships using MGO have not had in any significant problems. If an oiler loaded
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MGO that did create problems, however, that fuel would cause problems for an entire
battle group or force. The risk of loading MGO as oiler cargo fuel, using the current
bunker contract quality assurance arrangements, is unacceptable.
In ports that are frequently visited by Navy ships and where demand will be high
enough (10,000 barrels a year), DESC establishes bunker contracts with commercial
suppliers. Where DoD supplied fuel is not available and a MGO bunker contract has not
been established, ships may procure commercial bunker fuel on an emergency basis.
Bunker contracts are established for much smaller order quantities than an oiler would
typically require and there is no established procedure for loading oilers with MGO from
commercial sources. Adopting JP-5 as the universal fuel at sea would not change the use
ofMGO as a substitute bunker fuel when military specification fuel is not available.
(NAVPETOFFINST 4290.1 A)
4. JP-8 (Turbine Fuel, Aviation; The Single Fuel on the Battlefield)
JP-8 is a kerosene-based jet fuel similar to JET Al, the commercial industry-
standard jet fuel available worldwide. JET Al becomes JP-8 with the addition of three
mandatory additives: Fuel System Icing Inhibitor, Corrosion Inhibitor, and Electrical
Conductivity Additive. These additives are also required in JP-5 (JP-8 The Single Fuel
Forward, p. 87).
In order to reduce the number of types of fuel required for military operations
ashore and maximize compatibility with commercial fuel, JP-8 has been designated the
single fuel on the battlefield for DoD forces ashore. Almost all Army, Air Force, Marine,
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and Navy aircraft, vehicles and equipment ashore operate using JP-8. Older equipment
that operates on other fuels will be replaced with equipment that uses JP-8. (DESC
website)
Because the minimum flash point requirement is only 100° F, JP-8 is not approved
for shipboard use. With the exception ofminimum flash point, JP-8 and JP-5 are the same
type of fuel. Because JP-8 is essentially the common worldwide jet fuel, however, the
commercial availability and refinery production of JP-8 and JP-5 are significantly different.
The difference in flash point also results in very subtle differences in the physical and
chemical characteristics of JP-8 and JP-5. DoD's testing and experience with JP-8 is
examined by this research when indicative of the probable results of adopting JP-5 as the
universal fuel at sea.
5. JET Al and JET A (Commercial Jet Fuel)
JET Al is the commercial industry standard for aviation fuel, available worldwide.
JET Al is essentially identical to JP-8 except that it may not contain three additives that
are mandatory in JP-8. JET A is an industry standard variant ofJET Al used only within
the U.S. for domestic flights. The sole difference between JET Al and JET A is the
minimum freeze point requirement. JET Al specifies a - 47° rninimum freeze point. JET
A specifies a - 40° minimum freeze point. JET Al is frequently used as a substitute for
JP-8 by DoD forces ashore and was used as the single fuel on the battlefield during Desert
Storm. (JP-8 The Single Fuel Forward, p. 6)
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Because JET Al and JET A are essentially identical to JP-8, which is very similar
to JP-5, technical testing and use ofthese commercial fuels in diesel engines is examined
by this research when indicative of the probable results of using JP-5.
6. Fuel Costs
The prices DoD pays to refineries for fuel rise and fall with the commercial market.
In order to facilitate annual budgeting by the services while fuel prices continuously
change, DESC annually sets fixed standard prices that they will charge the services for
each fuel type.
DESC operates on a non-profit reimbursable basis. Standard prices are based on
estimated fuel costs plus a mark-up to reimburse DESC for its costs. DESC's profits and
losses are carried forward into the following years and standard prices are estimated each
year to return the retained income balance to zero. Table 1 below provides DESC's FY
2000 standard prices and the average price paid per gallon during FY 1999 for the fuels
discussed above.






Table 1 . FY 2000 DESC Standard Prices for Bulk Fuels and FY 1999 Average Purchase
Price per Gallon (NAVPETOFF NOTICE 4265, DESC Fact Book FY 99)
Because DESC standard prices include all the costs of fuel support, including
transportation, storage, administrative costs, and all other overhead, over the long-term
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they reflect the true price of fuel to the taxpayer. The mark-up on MGO is lower than the
other fuels reflecting the lower cost of direct delivery bunker contracts that do not require
government storage and distribution. The higher price ofJET Al reflects higher prices for
smaller quantities at more expensive overseas locations rather than a more expensive fuel.
For the purpose of this research, the differences in price between the fuels are more
significant than the prices themselves. Historically, these differences have been a little
larger, with JP-5 costing approximately five cents more per gallon than F-76.
C. PETROLEUM LOGISTICS ORGANIZATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The following paragraphs identify organizations with bulk petroleum
responsibilities significant to this thesis research.
1. Defense Energy Support Center (DESC)
The Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) is responsible for supporting all DoD
energy needs and is the Integrated Materiel Manager for all DoD petroleum requirements.
DESC performs worldwide acquisition and contract administration for all DoD bulk fuel
requirements, purchasing more light refined petroleum product than any other single
organization or company in the world. DESC also owns, finances, and monitors
worldwide DoD bulk fuel inventories, oversees fuel terminal and storage operations
worldwide, manages bulk fuel transportation and distribution, and is responsible for bulk
fuel quality assurance and surveillance. (DESC Website)
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DESC is organized into Commodity Business Units (CBU's), each ofwhich is
responsible for a part of the DESC mission. Defense Energy Support Center Region
staffs, located worldwide, interface with customers and coordinate support within their
geographical areas of responsibility. CBU's with responsibilities related to this research
are discussed below:
a. Bulk Fuels CBU
The Bulk Fuels CBU functions include consolidating the petroleum
requirements of the services; monitoring worldwide DoD fuel inventories; contracting for
bulk fuels; quality assurance and surveillance; and managing worldwide bulk petroleum
transportation. Transportation responsibilities include establishing policy, managing the
transportation budget, and using MSC tankers to move bulk petroleum from refineries to
DFSPs and between DFSPs. (DESC website)
b. Direct Delivery Fuels CBU
The Direct Delivery Fuels CBU provides acquisition and management for
the Ship's Bunker Fuel Program and for aircraft refueling at commercial airports. Using
these programs, end-user customers order and receive fuel directly from commercial
vendors at locations where DoD fuel is not available. The Ships' Bunker Fuel Program
provides propulsion fuels for Navy, Coast Guard, MSC, and U.S. government owned and
chartered ships at 184 ports in the U.S. and 51 other countries. (DESC website)
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c. Facilities and Distribution CBU
The Facilities and Distribution CBU manages worldwide fuel terminal
operations, fuel inventory accounting, and Fuel Exchange Agreements (FEA's) with allied
militaries. In partnership with the Unified Commands and the Military Services, DESC
Facilities and Distribution develops the annual Inventory Management Plan (IMP), which
establishes war reserve and peacetime operating stock inventory levels.
The Facilities and Distribution CBU's Optimization Division uses
managerial accounting techniques, statistical tools, modeling, and other decision support
tools to identify new business opportunities, evaluate current systems, improve efficiency,
validate mission support capability, etc.
2. Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics)
The Deputy ChiefofNaval Operations (Logistics) (OPNAV N4) ensures the
adequacy of support for operating force logistics requirements including logistics review
ofwar plans, integrating Navy logistics within the joint arena, and mobilization and
industrial preparedness planning efforts (OPNAVINST 4000.85). The Energy Plans and
Policy Branch for Deputy Chief ofNaval Operations, Logistics has contracted with
consultants and intends to establish a process action team (PAT) to study replacing F-76
with JP-5.
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3. Navy Petroleum Office (NAVPETOFF)
The Navy Petroleum Office (NAVPETOFF) oversees all Navy fuel programs
maintaining close liaison with DESC as the Navy's representative for all petroleum related
issues (NAVPETOFF website). NAVPETOFF provide technical direction for petroleum
programs within the Navy including facilities management and storage utilization,
technical operations, and quality surveillance. (NAVPETOFF Website)
4. Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)
"The Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) is the Navy Department's central
activity for designing, engineering, integrating, building and procuring U.S. Naval ships
and shipboard weapons and combat systems" (NAVSEA Website). NAVSEA establishes
military specifications for Navy bunker fuels. (David Higgins, 7 September 1999)
5. Military Sealift Command (MSC)
The Military Sealift Command (MSC) provides petroleum logistics transportation
support at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, not only for the Navy, but also for
all ofDoD.
a. Sealift Program
MSC's Sealift Program provides all strategic sealift for government
requirements. During normal peacetime conditions, the MSC Sealift Program operates
approximately eight to ten commercial fuel tankers under long-term charter to DoD.
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These common-user (for support of all services) tankers lift bulk fuels from refineries for
shipment to DFSPs and transfer fuel between DFSPs as needed. During contingencies,
these tankers also deliver fuels to the theater. When requirements exceed the capacity of
the long-term charter tankers, such as during contingencies, MSC will charter additional
commercial tankers or may activate Ready Reserve Force (RRF) vessels. DESC and MSC
work closely to coordinate the strategic movement of fuel, with DESC determining
requirements and scheduling and MSC maintaining operational control of the tankers.
b. Navy Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF)
MSC's Navy Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF) is the backbone ofthe Navy's
operational logistics. The NFAF includes 13 Kaiser Class oilers (TAOs). These oilers are
used exclusively for to support Navy requirements and they are fully capable of underway
replenishment (UNREP) of combatants. TAOs serve as shuttle oilers, transporting fuel
from DFSPs to deployed ships and battle groups, and as station ships, assigned to battle
groups as organic oilers. NFAF oilers are crewed by civilian mariners and a small military
communications detachment.
c. Prepositioning Program
MSC's Maritime Prepositioning Force includes three prepositioned tankers
for support ofNavy fuel requirements.
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6. Maritime Administration (U.S. Dept. of Transportation)
The U.S. Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration (MARAD)
maintains the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF), which includes an inactive
(mothball) fleet of 20 tankers that can be activated to during national emergencies. Ten of
the NDRF tankers are part ofthe rapid activation Ready Reserve Force (RRF). Each RRF
tanker is maintained in a designated days-to-operationally-ready status of four, five, ten,
20 or 30 days. The RRF is intended to support rapid deployment by meeting the critical
surge requirements that might occur before sufficient commercial vessels could be
chartered. The RRF includes ten ofthe twenty NDRF tankers. Five ofthe RRF ships are
Offshore Petroleum Discharge System (OPDS) tankers, which carry an underwater hose
system and can deliver fuel to forces ashore from four miles out to sea. Once activated,
RRF ships are under the control ofMSC. (Keane)
7. Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC)
The U.S. Army's Military Traffic Management Command has contracting
authority for pipeline, barge, rail car and truck transportation of bulk fuels. MTMC and
DESC maintain a close working relationship to manage shipments.
8. Geographical Unified Commanders
DoD has assigned unified combatant commanders for geographic regions of the
world. For example, all DoD activities within the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas are
under the operational command of U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific (USCINCPAC).
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Unified commanders have the predominant fuels responsibility within their geographic
area. Joint Petroleum Offices (JPOs) are assigned under the geographic unified
commanders to manage their fuels responsibilities. (Joint Pub 4-03)
9. Joint Petroleum Offices (JPOs)
Under the direction of the Geographical Unified Commander, the JPOs work with
DESC and the service components to coordinate fuel support within their assigned area of
responsibility. Joint Petroleum Offices are the functional experts in the fuel requirements
and infrastructure capabilities for their assigned region. They coordinate the collection of
data for determining war reserves and operating stock requirements, track inventories at
DFSPs ensuring that war reserves are maintained, coordinate DFSP replenishment,
participate in the preparation of operational and contingency planning, and coordinate fuel
support during the execution of exercises and operations in their area.
D. THE PETROLEUM SUPPLY CHAIN
The term supply chain implies that petroleum logistics functions operate in a series
of links from the refinery to the warship. To a large degree this is true. These links
includes refinery purchase, strategic lift, DFSP storage, shuttle lift, cargo consolidation
(CONSOL), station ships, and underway replenishment (UNREP). These links are,
however, not fixed. Alternative methods of delivering DoD fuels ensure the system is
flexible and sustainable. In addition, fuels can also be obtained from local sources, outside
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the main supply chain for DoD owned fuel. Figure one below, graphically depicts the
petroleum supply chain.
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Figure 1 . The Petroleum Supply Chain
The end of the petroleum supply chain is UNREP of combatants in the operational
area. Delivery to the forces at sea in the area of operations is critical. If ships need to
leave the area of operations to transit and receive logistics support 50% of the time, for
example, force strength is effectively halved. In this case, delivering logistics support to
the theater doubles the strength of the force. While the example above is an unrealistically
extreme case, it illustrates the "force multiplier" provided by in theater underway
replenishment. The purpose of the petroleum logistics chain is to provide the right fuel, in
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the right place, at the right time to enable forces to remain mission capable in the area of
operation indefinitely.
1. Acquisition Logistics - Contracting, Ordering and Delivery
a. Determining Requirements
Each year, the Unified Commands, the Military Services, and DESC,
through a coordinated effort, promulgate an Inventory Management Plan (IMP) for bulk
petroleum. For each DFSP, the IMP sets war reserve and peacetime operating stock
inventory levels. Based on the total inventory objectives set by the IMP, inventories on-
hand and anticipated demand at each DFSP, DESC estimates and contracts for the
quantity of fuels required at each DFSP. When contingencies increase requirements,
DESC responds with supplemental contracts for additional fuel. (DESC website)
b. Contracting with Refineries
Bulk fuels are purchased from refinery sources under annual delivery order
contracts. Worldwide bulk fuel requirements are divided into four major purchase
programs. Western Pacific contracts support U.S. military forces in the Pacific, Indian
Ocean, and Middle East areas. Atlantic, Europe and Mediterranean contracts support
customers in Europe Iceland and the Azores. Domestic requirements are split into two
programs, U.S. East and Gulf Coast contracts (which also support requirements in
Panama, Puerto Rico and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba) and U.S. Inland and West Coast
contracts (which include Alaska and Hawaii).
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Contracts are established through competition among offerors through a
negotiation process. Terms and conditions of the contract must be discussed and
negotiated with each offeror because each refinery's total capacity, capacity by product
type, and commercial customers' demands are different. The price at which each
individual refinery can provide fuel will vary depending upon the annual quantity
contracted, the size of each order, and other variable factors. These factors must be
negotiated to ensure each potential supplier can offer their best price by optimizing their
capability. Contracts are not awarded strictly to the lowest bidder. DESC uses a
sophisticated linear program that considers the quantities and prices offered by each
potential refinery source, demand and constraints at the locations where the fuel will be
required, the transportation costs between offering refinery sources and the locations
where the fuel will be required, and other costs. Using the linear program and negotiation
with offerors, DESC works to award the combination of quantities from each offeror that
will result in the lowest total fuel cost, including transportation and all other costs.
(DESC website)
Contracts include both requirements and indefinite quantity type contracts.
Minimum and maximum annual quantities are defined in the indefinite quantity contracts.




JPOs and DFSPs track their inventory levels and projected requirements.
Using the inventory objective and the economic reorder quantities specified in the IMP,
these organizations estimate when the reorder point will be reached and request
replenishment at that point. In coordination with refineries, MTMC (for surface and barge
transport) and MSC (for tanker transport), DESC places a fuel order with a contracted
refinery to replenish the DFSP inventory. (DESC website)
Contracts contain price adjustment clauses with prices indexed to
commercial market price indicators. As market prices and these corresponding indicators
rise or fall, contract prices are adjusted parallel with the commercial market. When fuel is
ordered under contract, DESC pays the contract price as adjusted by the contract price
index on the date of delivery. (DESC website)
d. Transportation to DFSPs
Most bulk fuel ordered by DESC is purchased free on board (FOB) origin.
Origin purchase allows DESC to ship at the lowest cost using the mode best suited to the
operation. Pipelines, tankers, barges, trucks and rail cars are used to transport bulk fuels.
About 60% ofDESC's domestic shipments are transported by pipeline.
The Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) has transportation contracting
authority for all modes except ocean tankers. DESC and MTMC maintain a close
working relationship to manage shipping requirements.
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Most overseas shipments are made by MSC tanker. The DESC Bulk Fuels
CBU manages shipments by ocean tanker. The Military Sealift Command (MSC) charters
and retains operational control of ships, responding to DESC's requirements. DESC in
coordination with MSC maintains a tanker transportation fleet of eight T-5 equivalent
tankers in support of its worldwide tanker resupply mission. This is a core fleet, fully
employed during routine peacetime operations. Flexibility, surges and unprogrammed lifts
are met by hiring spot charters on an as needed basis.
2. Strategic Logistics - Sealift and Defense Fuel Support Points
On a strategic level, fuel support includes fuel inventories located worldwide at
DFSPs and the capability to move fuel to the area of operations with MSC sealift.
a. Defense Fuel Support Points
Defense Fuel Support Points (DFSPs) are fuel terminals that store DESC
owned fuel. Table 2 below identifies the DFSPs worldwide that support Navy F-76 and
JP-5 requirements. Logically, many of these DFSPs are located on or near naval bases.
Fuel stored is both Petroleum War Reserve Stocks (PWRS) and peacetime
operating stocks. PWRS are sized to meet the deployment and combat operation
requirements of a contingency in the geographic area until resupply can be obtained from a
secure source (DDOD 31 10.6). Peacetime operating stock levels are sized to cover
average peacetime demand and most variation in demand between routine replenishments.
PWRS and peacetime operating stock levels as well as the methodology used to determine
them are classified. When demand is higher than expected, even during peacetime,
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FISC San Diego (Point Loma), CA NAS North Island, CA
SUBASE New London, CT (F-76 only) FISC Jacksonville, FL
NAS Key West, FL (JP-5 only) NAS Pensacola, FL (JP-5 only)
NAVSUBASE Kings Bay, GA (F-76 only) FISC Pearl Harbor, HI
DFSP Carteret, TX DFSP Houston, TX
DFSP Craney Island, VA DFSP SeweUs Point, VA
NAB Little Creek, VA FISC Puget Sound (Manchester), WA
DFSP Souda Bay, Crete (NATO) NAVSTA Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
NSF Diego Garcia COMNAVMARIANAS Guam
DFSP Augusta Bay, Italy (NATO) DFSP Gaeta, Italy (NATO) (F-76 only)
DFSP Hakozaki, Japan DFSP Yokose, Japan
DFSP Akasaki, Japan DFSP Iorizaki, Japan
DFSP Kwajalein, Marshall Islands NAVSTA Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico
DFSP Senoko, Singapore NAVSTA Rota, Spain
DFSP Aden, Yemen
Table 2. DFSPs that Support Navy F-76 and JP-5 Fuel Requirements (NAVPETOFF
INSTRUCTION 4025.1D)
peacetime operating stocks may be depleted and PWRS used. Peacetime penetrations of
PWRS are reported to DESC and the Geographical Unified Commander and
replenishment is scheduled as soon as practical.
DESC oversees but does not operate DFSPs. DFSPs may be government
owned and operated, government owned and contractor operated, contractor owned and
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operated, or may even be owned and operated by an allied foreign government. Many of
the DFSPs that support the Navy bunker requirements are owned and operated by the
Navy.
At locations where pipelines connect the DFSP to Navy base piers, fuel is
delivered from the DFSP by pipeline to the ship or oiler. Where DFSPs are not connected
by pipeline to the Navy base piers, fuel is either delivered to the ship by barge or tank
truck, or the receiving ship must go to the DFSP's pier. Most DFSPs own the barges and
tank trucks used for delivery. Due to the quantities required, oilers must be loaded by
pipeline.
During normal peacetime operations and during most contingencies, the
nearest DFSP will be the primary source of fuel for Navy operations. To guarantee oilers
are loaded only with fuels that meet military specifications, unless specifically arranged,
oilers will only load at DFSPs. DFSPs are also the required source for Navy ships' in-port
replenishment when at a location supported by a DSFP.
b. Strategic Sealift - Movement to the Theater ofOperations
Strategic lift of fuel is accomplished through tanker transportation directly
from refineries or from DFSPs outside the area of operations to the theater. For Navy fuel
requirements, strategic sealift usually moves fuel to the DFSP nearest to the operations.
Strategic sealift is common-user transportation; that is it supports all
services and defense agencies, and is the responsibility of Military Sealift Command
(MSC). MSC must apportion strategic sealift capacity to meet joint requirements. When
29
assets are insufficient to fill all requirements on schedule, the unified commander
determines shipment priorities.
The first asset used for strategic sealifi is MSC's core fleet, discussed
above. During contingencies, MSC will procure additional charter tankers to meet the
additional requirements of strategic lift. If possible, U.S. flagged commercial tankers will
be chartered, however, strategic fuel lift requirements during contingencies are expected
to exceed the capacity of suitable and available U.S. merchant tankers. If a sufficient
number ofmerchant tankers are not available, MSC must use foreign flagged ships or
activate RRF and NDRF tankers. (Miller, p. 39)
In addition to moving fuel forward to the DFSP nearest to the operations,
tankers can also deliver fuel directly to forces at sea by transferring fuel at sea to oilers and
can even provide limited underway replenishment to combatants. These options will be
discussed below.
3. Operational Logistics - Shuttle Ships and Cargo Consolidation
The acquisition and strategic logistics links in the supply chain provide fuel to the
area of operations, usually to the nearest DFSP. Operational logistics delivers that fuel to
forces at sea in the area of operations.
Sustaining multiple battle groups at sea requires a continuous flow of shiploads of
fuel. MSC's Kaiser Class Oilers (TAOs) will shuttle fuel from the nearest DFSP to the
forces. Ships steaming independently or in a smaller task force are not typically
accompanied by an oiler, and receive UNREP directly from these shuttle oilers. For battle
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group resupply, shuttle oilers will transfer cargo fuel to the oiler accompanying the battle
group and, if time permits, may also directly UNREP combatants. The transfer of cargo
fuel to oilers at sea is referred to as cargo consolidation (CONSOL).
In addition to delivering fuel to the DFSP nearest to the operating area,
commercial, NDRF, and RRF tankers can bypass the DFSP nearest the theater and
directly CONSOL oilers at sea using the receiving oilers UNREP stations. Although this
direct delivery capability makes using the nearest DFSP unnecessary, it is not usually
advantageous to CONSOL from tankers. Fuel consolidations from merchant tankers can
take up to two days operating only in daylight hours (Miller, p. 25).
The larger the force and the further from DFSP storage, the greater the number of
oilers required to shuttle consolidation cargos to the deployed force. At some
combination offeree size and distance the number of oilers will be insufficient and direct
tanker CONSOL will become advantageous or even necessary.
Shuttle ships are assigned under the operational control ofthe logistics task force
commander. The logistics task force commander coordinates with the force commander
and battle group commanders to develop shuttle schedules. Battle group commanders will
be informed when a shuttle will arrive and the time it can remain with the battle group
before it should be released to support other forces or replenish. The battle group
commander assumes tactical control of shuttle ships while they are operating with the
battle group. Effective operational and tactical control is necessary to prioritize delivery
to where it is most urgently needed and to where it will not interfere with operations. In
addition, since oilers and tankers are defenseless high-value assets, effective operational
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and tactical control is necessary to minimize the probability of an encounter with the
enemy and to coordinate protective escorts.
4. Tactical Logistics - Station Ships and Underway Replenishment
The tactical end of the petroleum logistics supply chain provides UNREP to
combatants where and when desired by operational commanders. Ideally, each battle
group includes an organic Combat Logistics Force (CLF) fast combat support ship (AOE)
that will continuously remain with the battle group providing storage and distribution of
replenishment stocks of petroleum, ammunition, parts and stores.
Organic storage of replenishment stocks is necessary to provide adequate
endurance for battle groups. If a shuttle ship is lost to enemy action or mechanical
casualty, a station ship would be essential to ensure adequate fuel is on-hand to support
operations until another shuttle ship arrives. In addition, fuel consumption by a battle
group can have considerable and difficult to predict variance. The fuel economy curve for
ships is nonlinear and changes in speed and the intensity of operations greatly impact
consumption (Modisette, p. 8). Without the station ships' fuel stocks, shuttle
replenishment would be required much more frequently, based on the highest possible
consumption rates.
In addition to organic storage and increased endurance, station ships provide
flexibility for the operational commander to schedule UNREP when it will not interfere
with operations and when it is safe. UNREP ships transfer fuel to other ships while
steaming alongside at only 150 feet apart. At times sea state, restricted area, and shallow
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water can make underway replenishment impossible. Ships usually must change course
and reduce speed to conduct UNREP. During UNREP the combat capability of the ships
involved is significantly degraded. In a high-intensity conflict or during inclement weather,
the operational commander must have the flexibility to delay UNREP to unsure the safety
of both the receiving ship and the CLF ship. To ensure ships' fuel levels remain high
enough to delay UNREP when necessary, Battle Group Commander will typically
schedule replenishment of each ship in the battle group about every four days. UNREP
scheduling is an important operational issue. (Miller, pp. 3-17)
Ships and groups operating without a station ship receive UNREP from shuttle
oilers as scheduled by the logistics task group commander.
To ensure the capability to maintain forces at sea despite losses of oilers to enemy
action or mechanical casualty, the Navy has developed and produced modular fuel delivery
stations that can be rapidly installed on merchant tankers for tanker-to-combatant
UNREP. Each modular UNREP station has two hoses and can deliver two different fuels,
each at a rate of 3,000 gallons per minute or one fuel at a rate of 6,000 gallons per. One
station can be operated without increased tanker manning. Two stations would require an
additional eight to ten crewmembers. The UNREP capability ofmerchant tankers would
be significantly less than the capability ofMSC and Navy oilers. (Miller, p. 39)
5. Host Nation Support
In addition to DoD owned fuel and the petroleum supply chain discussed above,
Navy forces also draw on allied governments and commercial sources for fuel support.
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a. Fuel Exchange Agreements
DESC has established agreements with 91 countries to provide fuel to
DoD on a reciprocal basis (most of these agreements are for shore-based aircraft support).
These bilateral fuel exchange agreements (FEA's) are used as the second level of supply
when U.S. Government owned fuel is not available. Many of our allies also use F-76 and
JP-5 and are able to provide fuel to visiting ships through FEA's. Table 3 below lists the












United Kingdom F-76, JP-5
Table 3. Countries Participating in Bilateral Fuel Exchange Agreements
(NAVPETOFF INSTRUCTION 4025.1E)
Arrangements to transfer fuel under FEA's vary depending on the
agreement and circumstances. Support from some countries is very limited. For large
battle group requirements, the area JPO or battle group commander must arrange




Worldwide Bunker fuel contracts provide a third level of supply where
U.S. Government owned stocks and FEA's are not available. DESC has contracts for the
direct delivery of ships' bunker fuels in 94 CONUS ports and 90 overseas ports in 51
countries. (Ships' Bunkers Purchase Procedures)
The type of fuel Navy ships receive from these contracts is normally
Marine Gas Oil (MGO). Contracted suppliers are provided the DoD purchase description
for MGO and agree to provide fuel meeting the specification. Ordering officers (ships'
supply officers) are responsible for ensuring the fuel delivered meets specifications.
(NAVPETOFFINST 4290.1A)
DESC has contracted with a commercial company that provides sampling
kits, packaging and sample shipment to the contracted laboratory. MSC vessels take
samples for testing whenever fuel is loaded. These tests do not confirm the fuel is on-
specification prior to loading, but are used to check contractor compliance. In 1999,
DESC spent $100,000 for MGO testing. (DESC website)
c. Open Market Purchase ofBunker Fuel
In ports where there is no DFSP, FEA, or bunker contract, ships' are
authorized to make an open market purchase ofbunker fuel only if operational
considerations prevent delay of fueling until U.S. Government owned or DESC contracted
sources for fuel are available. Deployed ships are required, however, to refuel whenever
on board inventory is projected to drop below 80% of capacity. This requirement usually
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means that, unless an UNREP is scheduled shortly before or after a port visit, ships will
refuel during that port visit. For ships steaming independently, not in a task force or battle
group, bunkering from non-contract sources is fairly common. The type of fuel Navy
ships receive from these purchases is Marine Gas Oil (MGO). The Contracting Officer,
normally the ships' supply officers, is responsible for ensuring the fuel delivered meets
specifications. (NAVPETOFFINST 4290.1 A)
E. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
1. The Universal Fuel at Sea
In the late 1960's the navy used three fuels to power its ships and aircraft: Navy
Special Fuel Oil (NSFO) was used for steam generation; Fuel Oil, Diesel marine was used
in diesel engines, small craft and for auxiliary power on some ships; and JP-5 was used for
carrier based aircraft. Fuel Oil, Diesel and JP-5 were also acceptable substitutes for use in
boilers. (Tosh)
In 1967, the idea of adopting JP-5 as the only fuel used aboard Navy ships and
aircraft was first examined. At that time JP-5 cost twice as much as NSFO and it
appeared that there would be insufficient supplies of JP-5 to meet both propulsion and
aviation requirements. Although JP-5 was not adopted as the only fuel, F-76 was adopted
as the fuel used for ship's propulsion, replacing NSFO. (Tosh)
Since that time, interest in converting to a single fuel has continued. Surprisingly,
the interest in adopting JP-5 as the ship's propulsion fuel has not generally originated from
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supply logisticians. Much of the interest has been based on the potential for reducing
turbine engine maintenance.
The most significant study was conducted in 1992 by the Belvoir Fuels and
Lubricants Research Facility. That study concluded that conversion "would not be
detrimental to fleet operational readiness," but that the benefits are "very difficult to
quantify," and that it would be, "at least initially, very costly for the Navy." (Tosh) In
summary, the study did not present a strong case for converting to all JP-5.
2. The Single Fuel on the Battlefield
DoD forces ashore have adopted JP-8 as the single fuel on the battlefield (also
called the single fuel forward) used to fuel all DoD land based aircraft, vehicles, and
equipment. Although improved logistics capability is the most touted benefit of the
conversion to a single fuel on the battlefield, it was not the sole impetus for conversion
(JP-8 The Single Fuel Forward). In fact, prior to the conversion many petroleum
logisticians believed the conversion was not possible due to a limited availability of JP-8
from refineries (Roberts, 17 February 2000).
Conversion to JP-8 from JP-4 for land-based aircraft was initially proposed in
1975. The rational was commercial availability (it is JET Al plus additives) and increased
safety (JP-4 has no minimum flash point). Conversion for of all vehicles and equipment
ashore began in 1981 when the Ml Abrams Main Battle Tank and other gas turbine
equipment experienced severe cold start problems in Germany using NATO standard
diesel. Initially, a jet fuel-diesel mix was used in the winter months, but all NATO ground
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equipment was converted to JP-8 by 1992. Conversion of all DoD equipment ashore
worldwide, with minor exceptions, is fully implemented today. (JP-8 The Single Fuel
Forward)
DoD remains flexible in its single fuel on the battlefield concept. During Operation
Just Cause in Panama and the Haiti and Somalia peacekeeping missions, JP-5 was
designated the single fuel forward and was used in all Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine
Corps vehicles, aircraft, and equipment ashore. (White Paper on JP-8, pp. 10-11). During
Desert Storm JET Al was used as the Single Fuel on the Battlefield (JP-8 The Single Fuel
Forward).
F. THE UNIVERSAL-FUEL-AT-SEA CONCEPT DEFINED
The universal-fiiel-at-sea concept simply replaces F-76 purchased by DESC and
stored in DFSPs as war reserve and peacetime operating stocks with JP-5. Although the
concept as defined by this research is simple, it is variously interpreted and sometimes
misunderstood. The most frequent misunderstandings encountered while discussing this
research with DoD personnel were, that if JP-5 is the universal fuel at sea, F-76 and MGO
can never be used and since JP-5 is not available from commercial vendors it will reduce
the number of "gas stations" available to the warfighter.
Although JP-5 is a military specification fuel that is not available to the warfighter
from commercial vendors, F-76 is also a military specification fuel that is not available to
the warfighter from commercial vendors. The universal-fiiel-at-sea concept does not mean
that F-76 and MGO cannot be used. It does not mean that F-76 supplied by allies under
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FEA's or MGO supplied by commercial sources under bunker contracts cannot be used.
Adopting a universal fuel at sea does not mean the principles of maximizing flexibility and
host nation support would be abandoned.
Just as the Air Force continues to refuel with JET Al at commercial airports
though JP-8 is the single fuel ashore, the Navy would continue to bunker with MGO from
in ports without DoD fuel stocks though JP-5 is the universal fuel at sea. JET Al , not JP-
8, was the single fuel on the battlefield (ashore) during Desert Storm (JP-8 The Single
Fuel Forward). JP-5, not JP-8, was the single fuel on the battlefield (ashore) during
Operation Just Cause in Panama and the Haiti and Somalia peacekeeping missions (White
Paper on JP-8, pp. 10-11).
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter provided background information relevant to replacing F-76 with JP-
5 and adopting JP-5 as the universal fuel at sea. Chapter III examines the technical issues
relating to using JP-5 in shipboard equipment and the feasibility of replacing F-76 with JP-
5.
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III. TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY AND MAINTENANCE IMPACTS
A. INTRODUCTION
Adopting JP-5 as the universal fuel at sea will only be possible if all systems and
equipment can operate satisfactorily with JP-5. JP-5 has often been used as a bunker fuel
when F-76 was not available, even during contingency operations and for extended
periods. JP-5 that no longer meets aviation specifications, but is still suitable for bunker
fuel is infrequently but routinely downgraded to F-76. During the Iranian crisis in 1982-
83, all ships operating in the Indian Ocean were replenished only with JP-5 because Diego
Garcia did not have stocks of F-76 (Tosh, p. 18). From 1980 through 1983, all Army
equipment operating in the Panama area out of Fort Clayton ran on JP-5; there were no
reported problems (Tosh, p. 21). Today, Naval Air Station Key West only carries JP-5
and supplies JP-5 as bunker fuel to visiting ships.
Although JP-5 has been routinely used as bunker fuel, not all JP-5 specifications
match or exceed all F-76 specifications. For example, the maximum cloud point for F-76
is -1°C, but JP-5 does not have a maximum cloud point requirement. Most specification
differences are not significant. In the cloud point example mentioned above, for example,
on-specification JP-5 always inherently meets the F-76 cloud point specification. Some
differences between JP-5 and F-76 have, however, been identified as potential problems:
lower heat value, lower cetane number, and lower viscosity and lubricity.
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This chapter discusses these potentially problematic attributes of JP-5 as well as
other fuel specification issues. This chapter also specifically addresses the technical and
maintenance impacts of using JP-5 in each of three types of systems the Navy uses for
propulsion and auxiliary systems: steam-power, gas turbines and diesel engines.
B. PROBLEMATIC ATTRIBUTES OF JP-5
1. Lower Heat Value
Belvoir Fuels and Lubricants Research Facility (BFLRF) tests found that on
average JP-5 has 2.6% less volumetric energy content (BTU) than F-76 (Tosh, p. 5). The
BFLRF study directly translates this into a 2.6% reduction in range and a 2.6% increase in
the amount of fuel purchased. (White Paper on JP-8, p.8)
Real world experience, however, generally does not support this theoretical
increase in fuel consumption. JP-8 has an even lower energy density than JP-5; five and
one half percent lower than diesel (JP-8 The Single Fuel Forward, p. 19). In real world
usage, there has not been an increase in fuel consumption where JP-8 has replaced diesel
in fielded vehicles and equipment. During the introduction of JP-8 to NATO, fuel
requirements were expected to rise more than four percent based on theoretical
consumption; however, there was no increase in demand (JP-8 The Single Fuel Forward,
p. 36). A JP-8 demonstration program at Fort Bliss in 1989 found no significant
differences in vehicle or equipment fuel consumption rates after switching from diesel to
JP-8 (JP-8 The Single Fuel Forward, p. 45). Moreover, since the introduction of JP-8 as
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the single fuel on the battlefield, there has been no indication of increased consumption
worldwide (Roberts). The Navy has not identified reduced range or increased
consumption as an issue or problem when JP-5 has been used as bunker fuel.
2. Lower Cetane Number
Cetane number is measure ofthe starting and warm-up characteristics of a fuel.
The minimum cetane number for F-76 is 45.0. JP-5 does not have a cetane number
specification and most samples do not meet the F-76 specification (Tosh, p. 6). Lower
cetane numbers can mean cold-starting problems and reduced durability in some diesel
engines and slower acceleration and lower maximum power in power-limited systems.
Potential problems specific to diesel engines are discussed in paragraph G below.
There is some reduction in acceleration and power in most engines using jet fuel
when compared to using diesel fuel. The loss is most noticeable at full throttle and
deviation is highly engine and injection system dependent. Engines that use pressure-time
metering of fuel show little power effect, while engines with higher injection pressures
have greater power deviation. Some engines exhibited increased power after mechanical
adjustment. Army testing found that power loss after changing to JP-8 was only
significantly noticeable in a few power-limited systems and vehicle operator acceptance of
JP-8 was favorable. The Navy has not identified reduced acceleration or maximum power




Lower lubricity can result in greater wear in fuel-lubricated pumps and fuel
injectors. The BFLRF study reports that individuals who participated in the Iran crisis
operations, during which JP-5 was the only fuel used, recalled a noticeable increase in
wear rate problems in fuel pumps and injectors. However, these failures were not
documented and failed parts were not inspected. The extent and cause of the problems
are speculative. (Tosh, pp. 1 8-20)
During Desert Storm, use ofJET Al in equipment ashore was initially blamed for
excessive wear in rotary-type injection pumps and other fuel-lubricated systems
Subsequent investigation determined, however, that some of rotary pump problems
resulted from a previously identified part design deficiency and the worn parts were
supposed to have been replaced. Most other fuel related problems during Desert Storm
were found to be caused by dirt and water contamination, flex-ring failures, unauthorized
maintenance practices, improper rebuilds and cumulative wear, rather than JET Al 's low
lubricity.
General Motors limited warranty provisions on the Commercial Utility Cargo
Vehicle because the fuel injection pump manufacturer maintained that severe wear would
result from using JP-8 when ambient temperatures were above 71° F. However, two
severe 10,000-mile tests conducted at GM's Desert Proving Ground, during the hottest
time of the year, found no pump wear whatsoever. (JP-8 The Single Fuel Forward, p. 26)
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JET Al and JP-8 have even lower viscosity than JP-5 and JET Al does not require
the anti-corrosion additive in JP-5. While the examples above are inconclusive and
additional wear in some fuel lubricated parts may be expected, the successful adoption of
JP-8 and use ofJET Al in all DoD systems ashore indicates that problems using JP-5
should be minor and manageable.
4. Lower Viscosity
The lower viscosity ofjet fuels may result in internal leakage from the high-
pressure regions of fuel pumps and injection nozzles designed for diesel fuels. In systems
that had significant power loss after changing to JP-8, this leakage may have been a larger
source ofpower loss than lower heat content or lower cetane number. During the Haitian
peacekeeping mission, where JP-5 was designated the single fuel ashore, contractors
operating commercial vehicles with General Motors 6.5L diesel engines and rotary fuel
injection pumps had hot starting problems due to low viscosity. The fuel injection pump
manufacturer acknowledged a design problem and issued a replacement hydraulic head
and rotor. Similar problems have occurred when JP-8 was used in commercial vehicles.
Since, fuel viscosity changes with temperature, all systems are designed to accept some
changes in fuel viscosity. JP-5 viscosity is higher than JP-8 and nearly the same as some
diesel fuels. Robust designs should not be affected. (White Paper on JP-8, p. 1 1)
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C. FUEL SYSTEMS AND STORAGE
1. Fuel System Materials
JP-5 is completely compatible with diesel fuel system materials (e.g. fuel lines,
filters, seals, etc.) (JP-8 The Single Fuel Forward, p. 24). Fuel system elastomers and
seals are unaffected by the conversion from diesel to jet fuel (White Paper on JP-8, p. 3).
Reduced water entrainment and emulsification could reduce fuel system corrosion. (White
Paper on JP-8, p. 2)
2. Improved Storage Stability
Using JP-5 will reduce problems related long-term fuel storage and deterioration.
Jet fuel is more thermally and oxidatively stable than diesel fuel, reducing the formation of
long-term storage deterioration by-productions (White Paper on JP-8). Because JP-5 has
stricter water reaction interface and water separation index specifications, it has better
water separation qualities and tends to entrain less water than diesel. JP-5 is also more
resistance to breakdown by microbiological organisms. Diesel contains more paraffin-type
hydrocarbons, which are a favored nutrient of some microorganisms. The Fuel System
Icing Inhibitor (FSII) additive in JP-5 also acts as a biostat protecting against




Switching fuels or mixing fuels in bunker tanks does not have technical or
maintenance impacts except when JP-5 is added to tanks containing deteriorated or
contaminated diesel or MGO. The introduction of the Fuel System Icing Inhibitor in JP-5
into tanks containing excessive water, debris, or deteriorating fuel will gradually kill
microbiological organisms and dissolve gums and sediments. This contamination will then
be carried into the fuel filters. In other words, adding JP-5 to tanks holding F-76 or MGO
will clean the fuel tanks and system and may initially result in more frequent filter changes.
Aircraft-quality cleanliness must maintained in tanks and fuel distribution systems
used to support aircraft refueling. JP-5 mixed with F-76 or MGO or stored in water-
ballasted tanks cannot be used for aviation. Since F-76 and MGO would still be used as
bunker fuels whenever advantageous, segregated storage and fuel systems would still be
required. Under the universal fuel concept, to the greatest extent practical, all JP-5 and all
fuel systems should be maintained to aviation quality standards. When other bunker fuels
are loaded, as much JP-5 as possible should be consolidated into separate aviation quality
storage. When JP-5 is mixed with other fuels or brought off-specification through
contaminated systems the flexibility of using this fuel for aviation and the benefits of a
universal fuel are lost. Most of the benefits of adopting JP-5 as the universal fuel at sea
are not, however, achieved at the individual combatant level where other fuels would most
often be mixed with JP-5. (Tosh, pp. 16-17)
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4. Extended Fuel Filter Replacement Intervals
The inherent cleanliness ofjet fuel will result in longer fuel filter replacement
intervals than F-76. As discussed above, increased filter changes may be necessary when
JP-5 is added to contaminated or deteriorated diesels.
5. Fuel Injectors and Fuel Pumps
Potential fuel lubricated injector and pump problems related to JP-5's lower
viscosity and lubricity were discussed above. JP-5 is a cleaner fuel with higher thermal
stability requirements, less water entrainment, etc. Using JP-5 will reduce diesel and
turbine engine injection system nozzle fouling and fuel system deposits.
D. AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS
Replacing F-76 with JP-5 as the primary ships' bunker fuel will not affect aircraft
operations as long as aircraft-quality cleanliness is maintained in tanks and fuel distribution
systems used to support aircraft refueling.
E. BOILERS
The fireboxes in Navy ships' boilers, both D-type and pressure-fired, are tolerant
of a wide spectrum of different distillate fuels. The design fuel for Navy pressure-fired
boilers is JP-5. Using JP-5 in boilers should have no significant effects.
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F. GAS TURBINE ENGINES
General Electric, the manufacturer of the LM2500 gas turbine engines used for
Navy ships' propulsion, specifically approves JP-5 for use in all their turbine engines.
Allison KOI series gas turbine engines, used for ships' service power generation, should
also operate at least as well with JP-5 as F-76.
Due to JP-5's higher hydrogen content and greater thermal stability, using JP-5
should result in lower liner temperatures and longer combustor thermal-cycle life. Using
JP-5 results in less soot production in the combustor and a reduction in the radiant heat
transfer to the liner. Using JP-5 also reduces the potential for coking or fouling in
atomizers that can cause fuel spray disruptions, hot streaks and damage to combustor
liners.
G. DIESEL ENGINES
Engines operating with JP-5 will not run hotter. After switching back to diesel
from JP-8, however, some diesel engines mechanically adjusted to optimally use JP-8
produce some over fueling at maximum throttle. Over fueling can cause excess smoke
and, only under the most extreme conditions, over-temperature (JP-8 The Single Fuel
Forward, p. 25). Since the heat density of JP-5 is higher than JP-8, optimizing
adjustments would be smaller and problems with using F-76 or MGO in systems optimized
for JP-5 would be less likely.
Theoretically, the lower cetane of JP-5 could reduce durability in diesel engines
that are near design limit for power output or are particularly sensitive to injection timing
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or ignition delay. In general, however, diesel engine durability should be similar or slightly
improved when JP-5 is used instead of F-76. Lower rates of lubricant oxidation, fewer
wear metals, less top ring wear, lower combustion chamber deposits, and slight reductions
of injector deposits have resulted when engines operate with JP-8. (White Paper on JP-8,
P- 6)
Theoretically, the lower cetane of JP-5 could make cold starting high-speed diesel
engines more difficult. But, the lower viscosity, higher volatility, and lower waxing of JP-
5 should make cold starting easier. The better storage stability of JP-5 will reduce fouling
problems that can occur in launch boats and other systems that are not used very often.
The lower viscosity of JP-5 has caused hot starting problems in a few diesel systems with
inadequate rotary fuel pump designs. In general, JP-5 is inherently better both in
significantly lower as well as higher temperatures than F-76 (Tosh, p. 2). Based on
extensive prior use ofJP-5 in diesel engines very few problems should be expected.
(Tosh, pp. 20-21)
H. EMISSIONS AND SIGNATURE
Emissions and signature from using JP-5 should be lower because the lower
viscosity, higher volatility, and lower cetane number ofjet fuel results in better
atomization, more premixed combustion, and slightly improved thermal efficiency
compared with diesel. (JP-8 The Single Fuel Forward, p. 25)
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I. SIMPLIFIED FUEL SYSTEM DESIGN
In order to maximize flexibility, ships must maintain the capability to use MGO and
F-76 as substitute bunker fuels. Segregated bunker and aviation fuel tanks and systems
will still be required on all ships. Simplified fuel system design for new combatants and
tankers will not be possible.
J. FUEL OFFLOAD FOR MAINTENANCE
Ships need to offload fuel for some yard periods and maintenance. Since MGO
and F-76 will be used as substitute bunker fuels and some JP-5 may be contaminated or
off-specification for other reasons, the capability to offload fuels other than JP-5 must be
maintained. Options for offload could include using barges to receive fuels other than on-
specification JP-5, contracting to sell offloaded fuel, or transferring fuel to another ship's
bunker tanks. At some DFSPs maintaining off-specification receipt capability would
likely require maintaining segregated pipelines and tankage.
K. CONCLUSION
The Technology Demonstration of U.S. Army Ground Material Operating on
Aviation Kerosene Fuel tested over 2,800 pieces of military equipment accumulating over
2,621,000 vehicle miles and over 71,000 operating hours in diesel and turbine driven
generators. These tests compared performance using JP-8 and diesel fuel (DF-2). Results
showed: (1) there was no statistically significant differences in average fuel consumption,
(2) power loss was apparent in only a few power-limited engine systems, (3) there were
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no catastrophic failures due to use of JP-8, (4) all fuel-related problems were resolved by
technical consultation or were found to be similar to those experienced with diesel, (5) JP-
8 is acceptable for use in diesel powered military systems. The study concluded that there
were no cost penalties associated with the use of JP-8, but reduced maintenance of fuel
systems, fewer replacements of fuel system components and extended periods between oil
changes had potential to significantly reduce operational costs. (JP-8 The Single Fuel
Forward, p. 136)
The results of using JP-5 in Navy systems should be similar. Potential technical
and maintenance problems include:
(1) Reduced power and slower acceleration in some systems.
(2) Increased wear in some fuel lubricated pumps and injectors.
(3) Marginally increased fuel consumption and decreased range.
(4) Hot starting problems in some diesel engines with rotary fuel pumps.
(5) Initially increased fuel filter replacement after mixing JP-5 with diesel fuels.
Potential technical and maintenance benefits include:
( 1
)
Reduced engine combustion-related component wear.
(2) Reduced nozzle fouling and deposit problems.
(3) Reduced potential for fuel system corrosion problems.
(4) Longer fuel filter replacement intervals.
(5) Reduced exhaust emissions and signature.
(6) Extended oil change and filter replacement intervals.
(7) Reduced low temperature operability problems due to fuel waxing.
52
(8) Reduced potential for microbiological growth problems in fuel tanks.
(9) Reduced water entrainment and emulsification problems in fuel tanks.
(10) Increased storage stability.
(11) Improved fuel and lubricant related cold starting.
Although it seems likely that the benefits discussed above will result in lower
maintenance costs, actual savings are difficult to predict. Much of any savings will not be
immediately apparent and even over time it may be difficult to directly correlate savings
with the increased use ofJP-5. Considering the higher cost of JP-5, maintenance savings
alone likely do not provide enough justification to adopt JP-5 as the universal fuel at sea.
However, reduced maintenance cost is one likely positive result of replacing F-76 with JP-
5.
The following chapter discusses acquisition feasibility. That is, will refineries
supply sufficient quantities of JP-5 to replace F-76 at reasonable costs?
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IV. AVAILABILITY AND ACQUISITION FEASIBILITY
A. INTRODUCTION
As discussed in chapter III, it is technically feasible to replace F-76 with JP-5.
Technical feasibility, however, is not the only feasibility issue. The primary reasons JP-5
has not been adopted as the universal fuel at sea are the limited availability of JP-5 from
refineries and the higher cost ofJP-5, typically five cents more per gallon than F-76.
These two problems are to some degree different facets of the same issue. It is the limited
availability of JP-5 that results in higher prices and at higher prices availability would
certainly increase.
Because DoD and allied navies are the only users of JP-5, worldwide demand and
production is relatively very small. JP-5 accounts for only about 3 percent of U.S. jet fuel
production (Task Group on Fuel Properties, p. 25). Refineries are designed and geared to
produce large volumes ofcommercial products such as gasoline, diesel, and commercial
jet fuel. They are reluctant to produce niche products such as JP-5 unless they obtain
contracts for large volumes. This reluctance and other factors discussed below both limit
the number of refineries interested in JP-5 production and increase the price. (Higgins, 22
September 1998)
JP-5 availability and sources are so limited, in fact, that DESC has difficulty
purchasing enough JP-5 to meet routine peacetime aviation requirements. Although
DESC has always managed to meet all requirements even during contingencies, it has
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sometimes been necessary to use their leverage as the largest refined petroleum product
customer in the world to pressure refineries and they have even been forced to impassion
patriotism to gain adequate support. (Scheffs and Peschka, 16 March 2000)
IfDESC has difficulty meeting routine peacetime aviation requirements alone,
wouldn't it be impossible to increase JP-5 procurement to support bunker as well as
aviation needs? Doubt about the answer to this question has prevented adoption of JP-5
as the universal fuel at sea since the issue was first examined in 1967 until today. This
chapter addresses in some detail why JP-5 availability is limited, how this limited
availability affects the price, how availability might be increased, and the fuel procurement
costs of adopting JP-5 as the universal fuel at sea.
B. CAUSES OF LIMITED JP-5 AVAILABILITY
1. Limited Excess Refinery Capacity
Environmental regulations and the "not-in-my backyard" attitude ofmany
communities has nearly, if not completely, stopped the construction of new refineries in
the U.S. Additionally, persistently low profits have prompted domestic refiners to
consolidate. Twenty percent of the U.S. refineries that were in operation in 1990 were
closed by 1997 (U.S. Energy Information Administration website). At the same time,
economic growth has increased commercial demand for petroleum products. Many U.S.
refineries now operate at or near full capacity. For some refineries, responding to DESC
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requirements means turning away existing customers. (Scheffs and Peschka, 16 March
2000)
2. Diminishing Importance of DoD as a Customer
DoD is the largest single purchaser of light refined petroleum products in the
world. Historically, this position has enhanced the refinery response to DESC
solicitations. Due to military downsizing, however, DESC fuel purchases are down 42.1
percent since FY 1988 (Task Group on Fuel Properties, p. 24). DoD's leverage as a most
important customer is not what it was. Although DESC's procurement quantities are
expected to remain nearly level in the future, worldwide commercial jet fuel demand is
expected to grow 2.6 to 4. 1% a year, further eroding any remaining refinery surge
capacity and weakening DESC's buying power (Task Group on Fuel Properties, p. 76).
3. Refinery Logistics Constraints
The petroleum refining process is complex. Not just technically, but also
logistically. Refineries generally do not store large quantities of either crude oil or finished
products. Most refineries are just-in-time operations receiving crude oil when needed and
delivering finished products matching specific customer orders for specification, quantity,
and time of delivery. Production planning is more complex for petroleum refineries than
for most other just-in-time manufacturers.
The specific chemical composition of each crude oil limits the types and relative
quantities of products that can be produced and determines the processes required to
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produce them. Producing more ofone product often limits the quantity of another
product a refinery can produce. For example, if a refinery produces more JP-5 they likely
must reduce the output of other jet fuels that come from the same chemical fraction, or
cut, of crude oil. At the same time, all parts of the crude must be used. Producing any
product necessitates producing other perhaps less desirable products. When a fraction of
crude is used to make gasoline, the remaining portion ofthe crude that is not suitable for
making gasoline must be refined into something else. Refineries rely on computers and
mathematical models to allocate crude oil components and refinery processes to determine
how and how much ofeach product to produce each day, week, or month to match
customer orders.
Ideally, a refinery has regular customers for all their products and maintains full
production in a near constant balance that maximizes the total value of all products and
minimizes changes in processes and outputs. Because the quantity of each product a
refinery can produce is somewhat dependent upon all the other products they produce,
refineries may be limited in their ability and desire to respond to new requirements, even
urgent contingency requirements, from DESC.
4. Refinery Technical and Crude Oil Constraints
When a refinery separates and breaks down the chemical compounds in crude oils
into useable products, the more restrictive the specifications for a product, the smaller the
quantity or yield of that product that will be produced from each barrel of crude oil. JP-5
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specifications are more demanding than other jet fuels and more demanding than any other
bulk fuel most petroleum refineries produce.
The principal process by which all petroleum products are refined is distillation.
Most refineries have an atmospheric crude distillation unit and a vacuum distillation unit,
together known as the crude unit. The crude unit separates crude oil into cuts or streams.
Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of a crude unit and table 4 identifies the typical streams
produced from a crude unit. The volume of each stream produced primarily depends upon















Atmospheric Distillation Vacuum Distillation
Figure 2. Schematic Diagram of a Crude Unit (from Task Group on Fuel Properties, p. 15)
Stream Typical Boiling
Range °F
Finished Products or Disposition
Gas <100 Liquefied Petroleum Gas
Gasoline 100-400 Gasoline, Naphtha
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Kerosene 300 - 500 Jet Fuel, No. 1 Diesel, No. 1 Fuel Oil
Gas Oil 400-650 Diesel, No. 2 Fuel Oil, Heating Oil, Cracker Feed
Vacuum Gas Oil 600-1000 Lube OiL Cracker Feed
Residue >1000 Asphalt, Coker Feed
Table 4. Typical Streams Produced from a Crude Unit (Task Group on Fuel Properties, p. 15)
A primary restriction in JP-5 production is that it must be made from straight
distillate. Many refineries further refine the gas oil and vacuum gas oil streams through
more complex processes such as cracking. Cracking processes break down larger heavier
molecules into the smaller lighter molecules that make up the more valuable gasoline and
kerosene streams. Because cracked fuels are less stable in long-term storage, JP-5
specifications require straight distillate fuel. Only the kerosene stream from the crude unit
can be used to make JP-5.
But only a fraction the kerosene stream can be used to produce JP-5. The size of
the JP-5 cut in the kerosene stream depends upon the particular chemical properties of the
crude oil refined. Aromatics, smoke point, naphthalene, freeze point, and viscosity
specifications constrain the low-end cut point. The 140° F flash point limits the high-end
cut point.
Table 5 below lists the amount of 140° F flash point jet fuel that could be
produced, relative to the quantity of 100° F flash point jet fuel that could be produced
from 15 crude oil samples. (Task Group on Fuel Properties, p. 15)
Crude Sample L J E G I O A B c D F H K M N
% Yield 60 52 47 38 18 11 1
Table 5. JET Al yields at a 140° F minimum flash point specification relative to yields at
a 100° F minimum flash point specification (Task Group on Fuel Properties, p. 81)
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Table 5 shows that JP-5 cannot be produced at all from many crude oils and for all
crude oils sampled the JP-5 yield was much lower than the commercial jet fuel or JP-8
yield. Refineries that receive crude oil that is unsuitable for JP-5 cannot produce it
without changing their crude oil sources. Refineries that do not have flexibility in crude
sources may not be able to produce JP-5 at all. (Task Group on Fuel Properties, p. 81)
5. The Impact of Environmental Regulations
The composition of gasoline and diesel fuels has been increasingly reformulated to
reduce pollution. Some of these changes have reduced the potential JP-5 supply. In
Europe, regulations have made diesel fuel more similar to kerosene and competitive with
the JP-5 portion ofthe crude barrel. For some U.S. refineries producing JP-5 may make it
more difficult to produce gasoline and diesel that complies with current state and federal
environmental aromatics and distillation regulations (Task Group on Fuel Properties, p. 6
and p. 81).
6. Reluctance to Support DESC Annual Contracts
Some refineries are reluctant to bid on DESC contracts because they are awarded
annually. Supporting DESC requirements may require investment to modify refinery
configuration and output and refineries already operating near capacity may have to turn
away current customers to supply DoD. Even if producing JP-5 for DESC would increase
profits, some refineries have determined it is not worth bidding on a contract when they
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risk losing it the following year. Small refineries are particularly risk averse and less likely
to participate (Tosh, p. 12), but even large refineries may be reluctant to bid on annual
contracts. Some refineries that have previously supplied JP-5 but lost subsequent
contracts will no longer bid. (Scheffs and Peschka, 1 6 March 2000)
C. THE IMPACT OF LIMITED AVAILABILITY ON JP-5 PRICING
The inability to produce JP-5 from some crude oils and the relatively lower JP-5
yield from all crude oils may give the impression that JP-5 should be much more expensive
than other jet fuels. This is, however, not true. The standard price of JP-5 in FY 2000 is
only $0.01 per gallon more than the standard price ofJP-8 and only $0.02 more per gallon
than the standard price of commercial jet fuel. The lower quantity ofJP-5 produced from
a barrel crude does not mean that total refinery production decreases when JP-5 is
manufactured. The portion of the crude that is not suitable for making JP-5 is still used to
make other products.
However, the balance of products that a refinery's other customers demand will
affect the interest a refinery has in producing JP-5 and the price that they will produce it
for. In North America, demand for gasoline is higher than in other parts of the world and
most refineries are configured to maximize gasoline production. Since gasoline uses a
different cut of the crude, jet fuel production, including JP-5 production, can be
complimentary to rather than competitive with gasoline production. In Europe and the
rest of the world, where demand for diesel and gas oil is relatively higher, there is strong
competition between jet fuel and gas oil and diesel for the kerosene distillate fraction of
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the barrel. As a result, prices for jet fuel and JP-5 are higher overseas than in the U.S.
(Task Group on Fuel Properties, p. 23)
Refineries that have been able to offer JP-5 at prices accepted by DESC are
presumably those with crude sources and configurations most suitable for making JP-5
and with and other product outputs that complement rather than compete with JP-5
production. Since JP-5 production is only 3% of total jet fuel production, it isn't
surprising that there are refineries that are well situated to make the quantities required.
The fundamental question is, what would happen to the price of JP-5 ifDESC purchased
approximately twice as much JP-5 each year?
D. THE AFFECT OF INCREASED JP-5 PROCUREMENT ON PRICES
1. DESC Bulk Fuels Assessment
DESC refers to the ratio of the quantity offered by refineries to the quantity
requested by their solicitation as coverage. For JP-5 coverage is typically only marginally
above 1 00%. Often 1 00% coverage is only achieved through negotiation. In other
words, there is little competition among refineries to supply JP-5 and to a large extent
DESC must accept JP-5 from all the refineries that offer it. Referring to DESC's bidder
selection process, an official from DESC Bulk Fuels said, "The last barrel always costs
more than the first barrel." This implies that any increase in JP-5 procurement will
increase the average price per gallon.
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DESC Bulk Fuels officials believe that increasing procurement quantities would be
difficult, prices would be at least marginally higher and in some areas and overseas prices
could be significantly higher. However, if the conversion was phased over a period,
perhaps as long as ten years, refineries would supply the required quantities of JP-5.
2. OPNAV N420 Assessment
An official from OPNAV N420, Head, Energy Plans and Policy Branch for the
Deputy Chief ofNaval Operations, Logistics, who participated in planning for and
oversight ofDoD's conversion to JP-8 ashore, believes DESC is overly pessimistic
regarding the refinery industries ability to support changes in demand. He believes that if
replacing F-76 with JP-5 is phased with sufficient lead-time for refineries to respond, the
industry will provide the increased supply of JP-5 without significantly increasing prices.
3. Implications and Lessons Learned from the JP-8 Conversion
Although the conversion ofDoD forces ashore to JP-8 was different from what a
conversion to JP-5 as the universal fuel at sea would be, there are some similarities and
lessons learned from the JP-8 conversion that could be valuable.
The JP-8 conversion was a much larger shift for the refinery industry than a JP-5
conversion would be. Consumption of JP-4 (the jet fuel used by DoD ashore prior to JP-
8) before the conversion was about 15% of domestic jet fuel consumption. The follow-on
conversion of ground vehicles, equipment and systems to JP-8 further increased the
magnitude of the demand shift. Adopting JP-5 as the universal fuel at sea would increase
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JP-5 consumption from only approximately three percent to less than six percent of
domestic jet fuel production. The manufacture of JP-8 is easier than refining JP-5,
however, so although the change was larger, in another respect it was easier for refineries
to adapt. In addition, the JP-8 conversion occurred during a period of military
downsizing, and reduced commercial demand.
Prior to the worldwide conversion ofDoD ashore to JP-8, DoD anticipated
availability problems and cost increases of five to ten cents per gallon over JP-4 (Task
Group on Fuel Properties, p. 25). Similarly, today and during all previous studies of the
issue, DESC and NAVPETOFF have predicted regional availability problems and higher
prices if JP-5 is adopted as the universal fuel at sea (Scheffs and Peschka, 16 March 2000;
and Higgins, 22 September 1998). But, the JP-8 conversion was successfully completed
with actual JP-8 costs only two to three cents above JP-4 prices. Today the standard price
of JP-4, for which there is very little demand or procurement, is $0.18 per gallon higher
than the price of JP-8 (NAVPETOFF Notice 4265). (Task Group on Fuel Properties, pp.
25-26)
Perhaps the most important success factor in the JP-8 conversion was that it was
carried out in phases over 16 years and the refinery industry had a lead-time oftwo to four
years to prepare for each phase (Task Group on Fuel Properties, pp. 26).
4. Implications of the FAA Task Group on Fuel Properties Study
After the crash ofTrans World Airlines flight 800 on 17 July 1996 was attributed
to a fuel tank explosion, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) charged the Fuels
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Properties Task Group 6/7 with assessing the feasibility of using a higher flash point fuel,
similar to JP-5, in all commercial airlines. Task Group 6/7 included representatives from
aircraft manufacturers, the petroleum industry, air carriers, and DoD. (Task Group on
Fuel Properties, p. 1)
Converting the entire civil fleet to a high flash fuel would involve about twenty
times the production quantity required to replace F-76 with JP-5. The conversion to JP-5
as a universal fuel at sea would only prompt those refineries best suited to refine JP-5 to
consider producing it. The conversion ofthe entire civil fleet would require most
refineries to make sizable investments in new systems and equipment to develop large
volume high flash point jet fuel production capability. The higher quantities would also
necessitate the use of unconventional refinery processing and increased use of cracked
stocks. Since JP-5 is made only from straight distillate, the resulting fuel would not be JP-
5. (Task Group on Fuel Properties, p. 14)
The Fuels Properties Task Group study included surveys of seventy-eight U.S.
refiners representing practically 100% of U.S. jet fuel production capacity, 33 European
refineries representing more than two thirds of European jet fuel production capacity, and
24 Japanese refineries representing 85% of Japanese jet fuel production capacity (Task
Group on Fuel Properties, p. 73).
The Fuel Properties Task Group estimated, given a 150° F minimum flash point, it
would require at least five years for the industry to meet demand and the cost of
production would increase six to seven and one half cents per gallon in the U.S. and over
twenty cents per gallon outside the U.S. (assuming a 7% return on investment). Of
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course, the market rather than the cost of production would set the price paid by
customers. (Task Group on Fuel Properties, p. 5)
Considering the slightly higher flash point and much higher quantities and refinery
investments involved, the cost increases projected by the Fuel Properties Task Group
should exceed the worst-case costs increase if JP-5 was adopted as the universal fuel at
sea.
Refineries would be far less urgently motivated to respond to increased JP-5
requirements than to conversion of the entire civil fleet to high flash jet fuel. Considering
the much less imposing adjustments required to increase JP-5 production, however, the
period of at least five years required to meet the civil requirement, could be considered an
indicator that the minimum phase in period for adopting JP-5 as the universal fuel at sea
should be greater than five years.
E. IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES TO MAXIMIZE AVAILABILITY
Clearly, in order to increase JP-5 procurement without significant price increases
DESC must find non-monetary methods to increase refinery interest in JP-5 solicitations.
1. Phased Implementation
As discussed above, the adoption of JP-5 as the universal fuel at sea would have to
be phased in order to provide refineries lead-time to meet requirements. The phase-in
period should probably be longer than five years and possibly as long as ten years.
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In FY 1999, DESC sales of F-76 were approximately 750,318,000 gallons. In
February 2000, DESC inventories ofF-76 totaled approximately 310,968,000 gallons.
The timing ofF-76 replacement would not for the most part depend upon consumption of
existing inventory.
DESC would have the option to phase F-76 replacement by DFSP or by region, or
in any manner that would best eliminate shortages and minimize price increases.
2. Long-Term Agreements
As discussed above, some refineries are reluctant to participate in annual contracts.
Other refineries likely reflect the risk of losing the next contract in their pricing. Since
bulk petroleum contracts are indexed to allow prices to change with market prices,
contracts do not lock prices in and neither DESC nor refineries risk that prices will
become unfair or untenable over time. Since contracts do not specify an exact quantity
that must be ordered, DESC retains some flexibility to order more or less as requirements
change. Longer-term contracts or guaranteed renewal would ensure a secure supply for
DESC and increase refinery participation at lower prices by providing the security of a
long-term commitment.
F. FUEL COST ESTIMATE
The effect of increased JP-5 procurement on prices is uncertain and cannot be
determined without actual contract negotiation. The typical standard price difference
between JP-5 and F-76 over the last two decades has been fairly consistent at five cents
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per gallon. The current price difference is three cents per gallon. Based on previous price
behavior, DESC opinion, and the FAA study, it is possible to estimate that doubling JP-5
procurement will increase the average price of JP-5 between two and five cents per gallon.
Bunker fuel requirements are expected to remain level for the next few years at
approximately 750 million gallons per year. A small drop in consumption, approximately
2.4 million gallons per year, will result from the decommissioning ofthe remaining two
conventional aircraft carriers during the next decade.
Combining the demand for bunker and aviation fuel requirements will to some
extent reduce variation in demand and permit a small reduction in DESC inventories while
maintaining the same safety level. However, a cursory examination ofdemand variation at
DFSP Puget Sound indicates there is a strong correlation between demand for aviation
fuel and for bunker fuel, and combining variation probably would not significantly reduce
safety stock.
Based on FY 1999 F-76 consumption (approximately 750 million gallons) and JP-
5 consumption (approximately 647 million gallons) and price increases from zero to four
cents per gallon, the fuel cost of replacing F-76 with JP-5 will be between 22.5 and 78.4
million dollars per year after complete implementation. The percentage increase in the
Navy's total fuel budget, based on FY 1999 expenditures (approximately $1,547,300,000)
would be between 2.42% and 3.88%. During the phase in period costs would be lower.
Table 6 below shows the increased fuel cost of replacing all F-76 consumption with JP-5
at different potential price levels. (Defense Energy Support Center Fact Book, pp. 5-6)
69
JP-5 price increase (dollars) .00 .01 .02 .03 .04
Standard price differential with F-76 (dollars) .03 .04 .05 .06 .07
Total fuel cost increase (millions of dollars) 22.5 36.5 50.4 64.4 78.4
Percentage increase in total Navy fuel costs 1.5% 2.4% 3.3% 4.2% 5.1%
Table 6. The Annual Cost of Replacing F-76 With JP-5
To put this potential fuel cost increase in some perspective, consider the market
volatility of fuel prices. The market prices of both fuels continuously change. A seven-
cent increase in the market price of fuels, which must be considered fairly routine and
which was certainly exceeded in FY 2000, would have the a larger effect than replacing F-
76 with JP-5 at a price that is seven cents higher per gallon than F-76. This does not
imply that the potential cost increases are not real or significant, but that the magnitude of
the cost increase is not overwhelming.
These estimates also only consider the increased cost of fuel. Some of this
increased fuel cost may be offset by lower maintenance, contract administration and
transportation costs.
G. CONCLUSION
JP-5 availability is limited; replacing F-76 with JP-5 will be feasible ifphased over
a period of five to ten years. By using longer-term contracts or guaranteed renewal
agreements with refiners, the potential for shortages and price increases can be minimized.
JP-5 costs more than F-76 and replacing F-76 with JP-5 will increase fuel costs.
Although the amount of the cost increase is uncertain, after full implementation it will
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probably be between 22.5 and 78.4 million dollars per year and between 1.5 and 5.1% of
FY 1999 Navy fuel expenditures.
Some of the increased fuel cost may be offset by reduced maintenance costs,
contract administration, and transportation costs.
Chapters III and IV of this research determined that adopting JP-5 as the universal
fuel at sea is feasible, but it would increase costs. The remaining question for this research
is: do the benefits of adopting JP-5 as the universal fuel at sea exceed the costs?
Unfortunately, this question cannot be answered with simple numbers. It is impossible to
put a price on the improved readiness and mission capability. But, the readiness benefits
are significant. As will be discussed in Chapter V, although the limited availability ofJP-5
is the major obstacle to adopting it as the universal fuel at sea, limited availability also
makes adopting JP-5 as the universal fuel at sea necessary.
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V. OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTICAL BENEFITS
A. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapters established that it is feasible to adopt JP-5 as the universal
fuel at sea, but it would be challenging to develop adequate refinery support for the
increased quantities and fuel costs would increase between 22.8 and 78.4 million dollars.
Although maintenance costs would be reduced by use of JP-5 as a bunker fuel, it is
difficult to determine the cost savings and in any case they almost certainly will not justify
replacing F-76. Contracting costs, inventory costs and administration costs might also be
reduced by replacing two fuels with a single fuel, but again these offsetting savings will
not justify replacing F-76. Because ships will still use MGO as a substitute fuel,
segregated bunker tanks and systems will still be required. Simplified fuel system design
for new ships will not be possible.
Replacing two fuels stored in DFSPs with a single fuel may reduce variation and
may allow reduced inventories while maintaining the same safety level, however, any
potential reduction would be small and would only provide a one-time savings. Duplicate
systems used to support two fuels at DFSPs might be abandoned saving upkeep costs or
they might be maintained increasing redundancy and readiness. Because ships will still use
MGO and will still need to offload for yard periods and some maintenance, however, some
segregated tankage and pipelines would still be required in some locations. Adopting JP-5
as the universal fuel at sea probably will not save money.
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The previous paragraphs summarized not only the first three chapters of this
research, but also the results of all previous studies of the potential universal fuel at sea.
There are, however, other benefits to consider. Those benefits are addressed in this
chapter.
In any contingency there are risks. The Navy depends upon delivery of adequate
fuel supplies to the area of operation to maintain operations on station. This support
requires both an adequate supply of fuel and adequate transportation to deliver that fuel to
forces at sea. The risks to both the Navy's fuel supply and to the capability to move that
fuel to forces at sea are greater today than a decade ago. Without corrective action the
risks of petroleum logistics failure will be greater still in the future. The following chapter
identifies the sources of the Navy's petroleum logistics risks and how adopting JP-5 will
reduce those risks.
B. FUEL SUPPLY RISKS
Many refineries now operate at or near full capacity and economic growth
continues to increase commercial demand for petroleum products (Scheffs and Peschka,
16 March 2000). At the same time, DoD is becoming a less important customer as fuel
purchases shrink as a percentage of refinery output. Meeting all DoD fuel requirements
during contingencies will be increasingly challenging in the future.
This challenge is more critical and more significant for JP-5 than for other DoD
bulk fuels. If JP-8 supplies are insufficient forces ashore will substitute JET Al; if ships'
bunker fuel supplies are insufficient, ships will substitute MGO for propulsion; but if JP-5
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supplies are inadequate the Navy will either be forced to limit flying or to fly unsafely
using JET Al or JP-8. Almost any refinery can produce both JET Al and MGO and even
at the height of a contingency, DoD requirements for those commercial fuels are only a
small fraction ofworldwide consumption. Not every refinery can make JP-5 and it is a
unique military fuel without any equivalent or substitute, commercial or military.
DESC maintains war reserves at DFSPs around the world, but these reserves are
only large enough to meet the deployment and combat operation requirements of a
contingency in the geographic area until resupply can be obtained from a secure source
(DDOD 3 1 10.6). War reserves will not sustain operations.
Although DESC has never had a mission failure, that organization has been
challenged meeting past contingency requirements. Immediately prior to Iraqi invasion,
DESC was contracting 100% of the JP-5 supply from Kuwait. When that source was lost,
only the patriotic impulse ofLeon Hess, founder ofAmerada Hess Oil, ensured an
adequate supply of JP-5 for the Gulf War. (Scheffs and Peschka, 16 March 2000)
JP-5 supply is the Achilles' heel ofDoD petroleum logistics. Without corrective
action, there is real risk that DESC will not be able to procure the JP-5 required to
support naval aviation operations during a major contingency.
C. FUEL TRANSPORTATION RISKS
Recognizing that oilers and tankers are high value assets that may be targeted by
the enemy, the Navy has developed a robust system that can absorb losses. The first
logistical safeguard is maintaining high fuel levels throughout the system. Ships routinely
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replenish when fuel levels drop to approximately 85% of capacity. This ensures that if the
battle group station ship is lost they will have sufficient fuel onboard to maintain
operations until the next shuttle oiler arrives. Station ship CONSOLS are scheduled
frequently enough to ensure that if a shuttle oiler is lost enroute the station ship's stocks
will maintain the battle group until another shuttle ship will arrive.
The second logistical safeguard is the flexibility ofpetroleum transportation assets.
All types of Combat Logistics Force ships, not just oilers, are capable ofUNREP. Even
carriers are capable of escort UNREP. Shuttle ships can serve as station ships. MSC
tankers can serve as shuttle ships and are also capable ofUNREP. Commercial tankers
can CONSOL or even provide UNREP if a modular delivery station is installed.
Nevertheless, DoD's capability to support all petroleum movement requirements in
the event oftwo nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts is questionable and the risk
of failure is increasing. In almost any contingency, fuel transportation requirements
exceed the capability of government owned tankers. Augmenting MSC capabilities with
commercial tankers during contingencies is rational, economical and intended; however,
the number of available militarily useful commercial tankers might be insufficient.
1. Aging Sacramento Class Fast Combat Support Ships
The U.S. Navy currently has eight fast combat support ships (AOEs) and thirteen
MSC Kaiser Class oilers (T-AOs) to provide tactical and operational petroleum support
(i.e., intratheater fuel movement, CONSOL and UNREP). AOEs are assigned as station
ships; an organic element of each carrier battle group intended to remain with the battle
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group to maintain on-hand resupply stocks and flexible UNREP timing. The Navy has
more battle groups than AOEs. When an AOE is not available for a carrier battle group,
both a TAO and an ammunition ship (AE) are assigned as station ships, the pair somewhat
equivalent to an AOE. TAOs also serve as shuttle oilers delivering fuel from the nearest
DFSP for CONSOL with station ships and UNREP to combatants operating without
station ships.
Four of the AOEs are Sacramento class with an average age of 32 years and a
planned service life of 35 years. As these ships age, their reliability decreases and
maintenance time and expense increase. To augment the insufficient number of station
ships and to replace the aging Sacramento class, a new class ofCombat Logistics Force
(CLF) vessels, the T-ADC(X), will begin delivery in fiscal year 2004 with a total of 12
ships scheduled for delivery by the end of fiscal year 2006. The T-ADC(X) only carries
18,000 barrels of fuel (10,500 barrels of ¥-76, and 7,500 barrels of JP-5) compared to
177,000 barrels for the Sacramento class. The T-ADC(X) will be capable of replenishing
ammunition and stores, but clearly it is not an oiler. If a T-ADC(X) is assigned to a battle
group, either a T-AO must also be assigned as a station oiler or the security and flexibility
provided by a station oiler will be lost. (Keane, p. 19)
Using TAOs as station ships is effective during peacetime, but they have a
competing mission to serve as the shuttle ships that resupply station ships. After the four
Sacramento Class station ships are decommissioned, in two nearly simultaneous major
regional contingencies as many as six of the thirteen TAOs might be used as station ships,
leaving only seven TAOs to perform the shuttle mission. During two near simultaneous
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major regional contingencies, or even during a single large contingency when the transit
time between the area of operations and the nearest DFSP is longer than a few days, the
shuttle capacity of the TAOs could be inadequate. If the number ofTAOs was
insufficient, one or more station ships would need to detach from their battle groups to
augment shuttle lift.
When a battle group is without a station ship, the unexpected loss of a shuttle
could result in insufficient fuel to maintain the desired operational tempo. In addition,
without a station ship the battle group commander loses control over when underway
replenishment occurs. Underway replenishment can only be scheduled when the tactical
situation, operations and weather permits. Without a station ship, the battle group
commander is forced to schedule underway replenishment whenever a shuttle oiler is
available to provide it. Providing UNREP instead ofCONSOL also reduces shuttle
efficiency. The time a shuttle oiler spends on station with the group reduces total shuttle
lift capability.
The AOEs and TAOs providing tactical and operational petroleum transportation
will be heavily tasked in any major contingency and requirements may exceed their
capabilities. MSC tankers and even commercial tankers can also provide shuttle,
CONSOL or even UNREP, but as discussed below, these assets may also be heavily
tasked.
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2. Declining Number of Militarily Useful Tankers
Over six thousand merchant tankers ply the seas, but most of these tankers are not
militarily useful because of their size. To be useful for DoD, tankers must be large
enough to carry a practical quantity of fuel, but not so large that they exceed the terminal
space, draft constraints and capacity to receive fuel at the off-load terminal. Generally,
only clean-product tankers sized between 6,000 and 80,000 deadweight tons are militarily
useful. Handy size tankers, between 6,000 and 35,000 deadweight tons, and carrying
between 48,000 and 280,000 barrels are most useful. Their advantages are their ability to
enter most ports, short time to clean if necessary and flexibility to carry different types of
fuel. (JP 4-01.02, p. IV-6; Keane, pp. 1 1-14)
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973,
adopted by the International Maritime Organization, an agency of the United Nations,
requires all new tankers to be constructed with double hulls or equivalent and all older
tankers to be retrofitted by thirty years after their date of delivery. After the Exxon
Valdez oil spill, Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), which requires
all tankers operating in U.S. waters to have double hulls by 201 5. Retrofitting old tankers
or purchasing new double hull tankers is expensive and many tankers are taken out of
service without replacement. Those that are replaced are often replaced with more
economical oceangoing barges or larger supertankers. Barges are not well suited for the
long-haul requirements of strategic sealift. Supertankers are generally too large to be
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militarily useful, and cleaning a crude tanker before it can carry fuel takes about two
weeks and is very expensive (JP 4-01.02, p. IV-6). (Keane, p. 27)
3. Declining Number of U.S. Flagged Tankers
Chartering U.S. tankers is preferred to using foreign vessels. The current U.S.
flagged clean product tanker fleet consists of only 62 active vessels (including the tankers
under MSC charter). The U.S. tanker fleet is small because operating U.S. flagged ships
is more expensive than operating foreign flagged ships. As a result, U.S. flag tankers are
used exclusively for domestic transportation that is legally protected from foreign
competitors. (Keane, pp. 24-26)
Due to declining demand and the effects ofOPA 90, the U.S. tanker fleet has been
shrinking rapidly and is expected to continue to decline. Between 1995 and 1997, barges
replaced approximately 12% of domestic clean product tankers (Keane, p. 27). During
the 1990s, 50 clean product tankers were removed from the domestic fleet and only ten
new tankers were added, a decline of nearly 40% (Keane, p. 25).
One source of the decreased demand has been military downsizing. In 1990 MSC
term chartered 21 tankers, today only five tankers are under term charter. DESC spot
charters (single point-to-point lifts) are also down 50% since 1990. Another cause for
decreased domestic tanker demand is improved oil company efficiency achieved through
mergers and product cargo exchanges. Consolidating resources through mergers and
agreements with competitors has allowed oil companies to supply products from refineries
closer to their customers. Today, the supply of domestic clean product tankers exceeds
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demand and 15 of the 62 active tankers are used to transport grain instead of fuel.
(Keane, pp. 26-29)
Although domestic clean product tanker supply exceeds demand today, due to
OPA 90 phase-out requirements, by 2005 demand is expected to exceed supply. To
support domestic fuel transportation needs, approximately 45 tankers are required. The
domestic fleet is expected to shrink to only 37 clean product tankers by 2008. At that
time, the number of domestic clean product tankers may be insufficient to meet
commercial needs critical to the economy. U.S. flagged tankers probably will not be
available at all to support contingency requirements and DoD will need to rely on RRF,
NDRF and foreign flagged vessels. (Keane, pp. 25-29)
4. Aging Ready Reserve Force (RRF) and National Defense Reserve
Fleet (NDRF) Ships and Declining Merchant Marine Manning
If the number of available merchant tankers is insufficient, MARAD will activate
the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) and National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) tankers. All
of the NDRF and RRF ships are common-user assets that will support other DoD forces
as well as the Navy. Eight of the ten RRF tankers specialty tankers that are not designed
or intended to support Navy fuel requirements. Most ofthe twenty RRF and NDRF
tankers were built in the 1950' s and 1960's, the newest was constructed in 1971 and the
oldest in 1945. As these ships age they will become increasingly unreliable and no new
acquisitions are funded. Another problem with activating the RRF and NDRF is manning.
The number of U.S. merchant marine tanker billets has declined from 6,180 in 1990 to
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3,840 in 1999 (Keane, p. 29). As the number of tanker billets declines, the number of
mariners qualified to man the RRF and NDRF ships also declines. NDRF tankers were
not activated for Desert Storm. The capability of the RRF and NDRF to sustain
contingency support primarily intended to support forces ashore and increasingly
uncertain. (Keane, pp. 23 and 59)
5. Dependence on Foreign Flagged Tankers
Since the U.S. tanker industry is approaching extremis and RRF and NDRF
support ofNaval fuel requirements is extremely limited, the Navy will depend upon
foreign flagged shipping to support strategic petroleum lift requirements during
contingencies. Using foreign flagged vessels is not an unacceptable risk or a crisis. More
than 50 U.S. owned tankers that fly foreign flags are considered effectively U.S.
controlled and could be requisitioned in a national emergency declared by the President
(Keane, pp. 31-32). Fifty-nine tankers flagged in NATO countries and 12 tankers flagged
in South Korea are also available to meet emergency DoD requirements under government
agreements (Keane, pp. 33-34). Foreign flagged vessels were used during the Gulf War
and are routinely used by DoD in peacetime.
In a contingency with less international consensus than the Gulf War, however, the
availability of foreign flagged tankers to support DoD might be restricted by their
respective national governments. The availability of militarily useful tankers is declining
worldwide, merchant tankers also have commercial commitments to support and the
market supply of ships does not expand when contingencies occur. Although MSC should
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be able to charter the tankers required to support contingency needs, there is some risk
that an adequate number of tankers will not be available.
6. Delayed Availability of Tanker Assets
Delayed availability oftankers could also present problems early in a contingency.
The minimum delay for any tanker would be the transit time to the theater of operations.
Many chartered vessels would first need to transit, offload their current cargo, transit
again and load DoD cargo before they could start toward the theater. RRF ship activation
takes only from four to thirty days, but preparing some NDRF ships to leave port would
take as long as 135 days. (Keane, p. 35)
7. Summary of Availability vs. Requirements
During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, MSC used 69 tankers: 4 RRF, 38 U.S.
flagged, and 27 foreign flagged vessels (Keane, p. 36). During the gulfwar the facilities
and infrastructure of neighboring countries were very good and refinery sources for most
fuels were reasonably close to the theater (Keane, p. 5). In future conflicts, DoD may not
be so fortunate and tanker requirements could be greater. During two nearly simultaneous
major regional contingencies, requirements could be more than double those ofthe Gulf
War.
At the beginning of the Gulf War, MSC already had 25 government owned or
contracted tankers transporting fuel, at the beginning of any future conflict that number
would be probably be less than ten (Keane, p. 36). The number of U.S. flagged tankers
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available would likely be less than a third of the number used in the Gulf War. In the next
decade, the availability of U.S. flagged tankers that are not already under long-term
charter to MSC may approach zero. RRF and NDRF vessels are aging and have potential
manning problems. Worldwide the number of militarily useful tankers has declined
significantly since the Gulf War. Over 100 effectively U.S. controlled, NATO and South
Korean tankers are theoretically available to DoD during contingencies, but the vast
majority ofthese ships are actively engaged in commerce and using them all would reek
havoc on the world economy. Tankers flagged in other nations could also be chartered,
but nations that do not support our goals might prohibit the use of their ships.
All this does not necessarily mean that a sufficient number oftankers could not be
acquired, but it does mean that there is risk that that would not be acquired and that
proposals that reduce tanker requirements must be considered.
D. REDUCING RISK WITH THE UNIVERSAL FUEL AT SEA
Adopting JP-5 as the universal fuel at sea would substantially reduce both fuel
supply risks and fuel transportation risks, improve readiness, and enhance the Navy's
capability to sustain major contingency operations.
The universal fuel at sea would replace F-76 war reserves and peacetime operating
stocks stored in DFSPs around the world with more flexible, critical and difficult to obtain
JP-5. In February 2000, DESC worldwide inventories of F-76 totaled approximately
310,968,000 gallons and JP-5 inventories totaled approximately 578,760,000 gallons
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(DESC Website). Replacing F-76 inventories with JP-5 would increase JP-5 inventories
by approximately 50%.
As an approved alternative to both F-76 and JP-8, JP-5 is the only fuel that can be
used by all services for all bulk fuel requirements. JP-5 stocks provide DoD more
flexibility and increase readiness to meet all contingency needs. Even the relatively small
JP-5 requirements of the recent Kosovo operations were initially difficult for DESC to
support. Although DESC personnel believe they certainly would have found a solution, if
two aircraft carriers had been needed for the operations, they acknowledge it would have
been very difficulty to provide timely resupply of JP-5 (Schefifs and Peschka, 16 March
2000). As a result, DESC intends to convert some ofthe JP-8 war reserves in the
Mediterranean to JP-5 (SchefFs and Peschka, 16 March 2000). These reserves could still
be used to support Air Force, Army and Marine requirements that would normally be
supported with JP-8. Ideally all war reserves, including those currently held as JP-8,
would be held as JP-5.
Larger JP-5 inventories would extend the time available for DESC to contract for
and deliver JP-5 to meet increased contingency requirements. Since other bulk fuels used
by DoD, including MGO and F-76, are more likely than JP-5 to available through host
nation support, increased JP-5 inventories could also reduce the needed quantity and
urgency of early tanker lifts.
The availability of JP-5 refinery production capacity sufficient to sustain Naval
forces during a major contingency is uncertain. By adopting JP-5 as the universal fuel at
sea, the routine peacetime production of JP-5 will be approximately doubled and most
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likely more refineries would be contracted by DESC to provide JP-5. Starting from a
larger supplier base and a larger base quantity, increased JP-5 requirements during a
smaller contingency might be more incremental than substantial. During a major
contingency, doubling the JP-5 production base would also improve the capability to
sustain operations. Although adopting JP-5 as the universal fuel at sea would double
peacetime consumption as well as supply, if the supply of JP-5 was inadequate to support
both aviation and bunker requirements during a contingency, DESC could contract with
local refineries for F-76 or MGO to support bunker requirements. The JP-5 supply, then
initially twice the current size, could be reserved for aviation needs. The risk of
inadequate refinery support for JP-5 requirements would be substantially reduced. By
attempting to procure substitute bunker fuels as near as possible to the area of operations,
tanker requirements could also be reduced.
E. ADDITIONAL BENEFITS WHEN ONLY JP-5 IS USED
Using a single fuel increases efficiency through simplified logistics, reduced
variation and greater predictability ofdemand. Replenishment at each level ofthe supply
chain cannot be planned to support the mean expected consumption. Such support would
be inadequate 50% of the time. Replenishment must be planned to meet the highest
reasonably expected demand. It is a statistical certainty that using a single fuel would
reduce variation in demand. The total quantity of fuel required would be more predictable
and the combined highest reasonably expected demand for both aviation and bunker
support would be lower than each requirement determined separately. In other words, a
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lower quantity ofa single fuel that supports all systems provides the same readiness and
safety level as higher quantities oftwo fuels that each support different systems. In
addition, increased predictability would enhance the logisticians' capability to push fuel to
the theater rather than waiting for submitted requirements.
Using a single fuel increases the days-of-supply endurance of the fleet. With two
fuels, endurance is limited by whichever fuel will be depleted first. A ship loaded with
only JP-5 has greater endurance than a ship loaded with both F-76 and JP-5. For example,
a ship might have plenty ofF-76, but be low on JP-5 and need an UNREP to support
aviation operations. The same ship with the same total amount of fuel, but only JP-5,
might have adequate fuel to safely sustain both propulsion and aviation for a few more
days. Increased endurance reduces the risk to operations from the unexpected loss of a
station ship. With a single fuel UNREPs can be less frequent. Less frequent but higher
quantity UNREPs allow greater freedom to schedule around threats, operations and
weather and less total time actually alongside.
The same principle also applies to whole battle groups. CONSOL of battle group
oilers must be scheduled based on expected consumption of the fuel that will be depleted
first. Using a single fuel increases the endurance of the entire battle group and reduces the
risk to operations from the unexpected loss of a shuttle ship. Less frequent but higher
quantity CONSOLS would increase shuttle oiler efficiency.
In addition, fewer tankers and oilers would be wasted moving fuel that is not
needed. Since shuttle oilers would never deplete the onboard inventory of one fuel and
still have excess of another fuel onboard, all fuel onboard could be transferred during
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every shuttle. Flexibility would be improved, planning would be easier and less
communication would be necessary. Fewer shuttle oilers and fewer escorts would be
required.
The benefits of a single fuel would be lost whenever MGO or F-76 was used as
substitute bunker fuel; however, the benefits of obtaining bunker fuel locally would often
exceed the benefits of using a single fuel. Using substitute bunker fuels will allow
reserving JP-5 to support the aviation requirements for which it is absolutely necessary
and obtaining bunker fuel locally would also reduce transportation requirements.
E. LOADING MGO ABOARD OILERS
IfMGO was designated the alternative bunker fuel, procurement of adequate
quantities at a reasonable distance would be much easier and nearly assured. MGO is an
acceptable bunker fuel, however, accepting MGO as the primary bunker fuel during a
contingency would require loading MGO as oiler cargo. Currently, loading MGO as oiler
cargo is not accepted.
The most significant difference between MGO and F-76 is the better storage
stability of F-76, but during a contingency high inventory turnover would eliminate long-
term storage. The real concern with loading MGO on oilers is the possibility of loading
bad fuel onboard an oiler and then replenishing one or more battle groups with that bad
fuel. While MGO that meets DESC purchase requirements would not cause problems,
much of the MGO on the commercial market today does not meet those requirements.
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Loading oilers with MGO during a contingency could not and would not be
handled in the same manner as ships' bunkering. The higher quantities involved would
necessitate new contracting and close coordination between DESC and suppliers. Most
suppliers would be refineries, not vendors. Much more rigorous quality assurance and
thorough testing would be necessary before loading. In most cases, the expense and
challenge of providing adequate quality assurance for loading MGO on oilers would be
much less than the expense and challenge of attempting to procure military specification F-
76.
G. CONCLUSION
The Navy faces considerable risks that during a major contingency the availability
of JP-5 and the availability of tankers and oilers to move fuel to the theater of operations
would be inadequate. These risks are increasing. Adopting JP-5 as the universal fuel at
sea would double the peacetime base refinery production of JP-5 and increase DoD
inventories ofJP-5 by 50%. Combined with accepting MGO as the primary bunker fuel
whenever advantageous, adopting JP-5 as the universal fuel at sea would substantially
increase the availability of JP-5 to support aviation requirements. It could also reduce the
number of tankers and oilers required to support operations. Adopting JP-5 as the
universal fuel at sea would enhance readiness and improve the sustainability of U.S. Navy
forces.
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSION
To maximize simplicity, flexibility and interoperability, Joint Publication 4-03,
Joint Bulk Petroleum Doctrine states, "Department of Defense components should
minimize the number of bulk petroleum products that must be stocked and distributed."
(JP 4-03, pp. 1-1 - 1-2) The current naval aviation fuel, JP-5, could also be used as the
primary fuel for shipboard systems (bunker fuel). "All shipboard systems, including
boilers, turbine engines and diesel engines should continue to operate satisfactorily, and in
some instances, with increased efficiency with JP-5." (Tosh, p. ii)
However, the Navy continues to use two fuels because JP-5 is more expensive
than F-76, the current primary bunker fuel, and the availability of JP-5 from refineries is
limited. The Navy faces a considerable risk that in a major contingency the supply of JP-5
will be inadequate to support the aviation mission. This risk to the JP-5 supply is also
increasing. Commercial demand for fuel is rising due to economic growth, but the number
ofU.S. refineries is stagnant. Many U.S. refineries now operate at or near capacity and
have little desire or even ability to increase JP-5 production to respond to DoD's
contingency requirements. Due to military downsizing, DoD's leverage as a most
important customer is not what it was. For technical reasons, many refineries cannot
produce JP-5 even ifthey want to support DoD.
91
For other DoD bulk fuels, JP-8 and F-76, there are commercial substitutes
available in large quantities around the world. JP-5, however, is a unique military fuel for
which there are no substitutes, military or commercial. Ifthe supply of JP-5 was
insufficient during a contingency, the Navy would be forced to either reduce the
operational tempo or fly using other jet fuels that are unsafe for shipboard use. These are
not acceptable alternatives. JP-5 supply is the Achilles' heel ofDoD petroleum logistics.
The conclusion of this research is that JP-5 should be adopted as the universal fuel
at sea, that is, the only fuel stored and distributed by DoD for shipboard use. The
principal justification is not maximizing simplicity, flexibility or interoperability, or to
lower maintenance costs, or reduce infrastructure, although those benefits can be
expected. Adopting JP-5 as the universal fuel at sea is necessary in order to expand the
JP-5 production industrial base to ensure an adequate supply ofJP-5 during future
contingencies.
Adopting JP-5 as the universal fuel at sea would double the routine peacetime
refinery production of JP-5 and increase DoD inventories of JP-5 by 50%. Although
routine peacetime consumption would be doubled along with the supply, during
contingencies when the supply of JP-5 is inadequate, substitute commercial bunker fuels
could be used and the then larger JP-5 supply reserved for aviation requirements.
Increasing the refinery supply of JP-5 to meet the needs of a universal fuel at sea
would be challenging and could only be accomplished over an extended period, possibly as
long as ten years. The cost of replacing F-76 with JP-5 is difficult to determine, but fuel
costs would probably increase between 22.5 and 78.4 million dollars per year. The
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increased fuel cost would be partially offset by reduced maintenance, administration,
infrastructure and transportation costs.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
OPNAV 420, Energy Plans and Policy Branch for Deputy ChiefofNaval
Operations, Logistics has sponsored a study that will examine the costs and benefits of
replacing F-76 with JP-5. Phase 1 ofthe OPNAV 420 study, scheduled for completion
near the end of calendar year 2000, will examine in detail whether refineries can provide
JP-5 in the quantities and places required. Phase 1 will also include a preliminary cost
estimate. Phase 2 of the OPNAV study will examine issues related to engine operation
and maintenance when JP-5 is used full-time. Phase 2 will also include the final cost
estimate. The OPNAV 420 study will the review the analysis of this research, and will
reexamine and refine the recommendations below.
Recommendation: Recommend DoD and the Navy adopt JP-5 as the universal
fuel at sea, replacing F-76 as the primary fuel used for shipboard systems and as the
bunker fuel stored in DFSPs as war reserves and peacetime operating stocks. Adoption of
JP-5 as the universal fuel at sea would not prohibit or discourage the use ofF-76 and
MGO as alternative bunker fuels or alter the use of fuel exchange agreements, bunker
contracts, or open purchase to obtain fuel.
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Recommendation: Recommend the N420 single fuel study research and
propose a timetable and methodology (by region or by DFSP for example) for phasing out
F-76 that will provide sufficient lead-time for DESC and refineries to increase the supply
of JP-5 and minimize price increases and availability problems.
Recommendation: Regardless ofthe final decision to adopt or not to adopt JP-
5 as the universal fuel at sea, recommend DESC develop long-term or guaranteed renewal
contracts for bulk fuel. Some fuel suppliers do not do business with DoD because DESC
bulk fuel contracts are awarded annually. This problem is particularly acute for JP-5
procurement. To produce JP-5, some refineries require investment that cannot be justified
by a single year contract. Long-term commitment by DESC will increase refinery
participation and reduce the cost of bulk fuels.
Recommendation: Regardless of the final decision to adopt or not to adopt JP-
5 as the universal fuel at sea, recommend DESC develop policy and procedures for bulk
purchase of and tanker or oiler loading ofMGO. In a major contingency there is the
possibility that the supply of F-76 would be inadequate or that tanker assets to transport
F-76 from a more distant refinery where it can be procured would not be available.
Purchasing MGO near the area of operations may be necessary. Establishing bulk MGO
purchase procedures, including quality assurance procedures, in advance will prepare
DESC for this potential contingency requirement.
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